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I. Introduction
Those zoning regulations which are designed to exclude a
substantial part of the regional population from potential resi-
dence in a community, or which have that effect, have been
generally characterized as exclusionary zoning.1 Thus defined,
exclusionary zoning is the subject of nearly universal condem-
nation in American legal circles. State courts have held exclu-
sionary ordinance provisions to be invalid.2 A number of state
1. See generally R. Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice §§ 7.23-.28
(2d ed. 1973) (for a New York perspective); M. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion
(1976) (especially ch. 3 "Zoning for Fewer People"); Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening
the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 509
(1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969).
2. While the leading states in this respect, beside New York, are New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, the courts of a number of other states, including California, New
Hampshire, Maine and Michigan, have taken strong positions in opposition to exclu-
sionary zoning. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Lau-
rel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel If); Soares v. Town of Atkinson,
512 A.2d 436 (N.H. 1986) (Rockingham County trial court adopted, in essence, the
advanced position of the New Jersey courts, enunciated in Mount Laurel II.). See
also Kopelman & Merriam, Regional General Welfare: The End of a Trend?, Inst. on
Plan., Zoning & Eminent Domain 2-1 (1985); Mallach, Exclusionary Zoning Litiga-
tion: Setting the Record Straight, 9 Real Est. L.J. 275, 289-94 (1981).
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legislatures have enacted statutes designed to prevent, or at
least discourage, exclusionary land use policies by local gov-
ernment.' At the same time, a substantial body of legal com-
mentary has emerged, of a tenor consistently antagonistic to
the practice of exclusionary zoning."
Although the term exclusionary zoning can arguably be
applied to any zoning standard or practice of a restrictive na-
ture, it has been most widely used to characterize those stan-
dards and practices which prevent regional housing needs
from being met - particularly the housing needs of the re-
gion's low and moderate income population. Unlike most zon-
ing controversies, which tend to affect little more than the
pocketbooks of a handful of individuals, or the status of the
single tract of land, exclusionary zoning issues directly affect
the future character of communities and regions, as summa-
rized in one melodramatic commentary:
The inevitable consequence of these efforts under-
taken on behalf of the ideal suburban community has
been that the promise of suburban life is not available to
all. Suburban exclusion of low-cost housing ... traps mil-
lions of Americans in deteriorating sections of the central
city. Closing the door to suburban life after the more af-
fluent and acceptable have passed the threshold has had
the duel effect of stigmatizing the hard core urban poor as
"undesirable" and denying them the opportunities neces-
sary to escape the cycle of poverty encircling them. Met-
ropolitan economic segregation obstructs access to quality
schools, while ineffective metropolitan transit systems
limit the potential employment market of inner city resi-
3. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1969) (popularly
called the "anti-snob zoning law"); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 65,580-65,589 (West 1980)
(mandating municipal housing elements and providing for fair share allocation of
housing obligations); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-52:27D-329 (West 1986) (establishing
an administrative procedure for determination of municipal fair share obligations and
for certification of municipal housing plans for meeting fair share obligations).
4. See supra note 1. It should be noted that a number of respected commenta-
tors have broadened the critique to zoning itself, arguing, among other things, that
unreasonable exclusion is intrinsic to the exercise of the zoning power. See, e.g., De-
logu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 Maine L. Rev.
261 (1984); Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 Syracuse L. Rev. 719 (1980).
19861
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dents. Tragically, many of the urban poor also suffer iso-
lation, and yet additional stigma, because of racial hostil-
ity. "[E]conomic-racial exclusion may well be called the
racism of the seventies. Coupled with vestiges of the more
open racism of the past, it furnishes an explanation for
the picture portrayed by the census figures, an image of a
suburban 'white noose' encircling a black inner city."5
The late Justice Hall, writing for the New Jersey Supreme
Court in the seminal 1975 decision in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
I), characterized the issue as a matter of zoning "for the living
welfare of people."6
The thrust of exclusionary zoning litigation has not been
simply a matter of seeking the invalidation of specific zoning
provisions per se. Rather, the litigation seeks the invalidation
of zoning regulations that act as a barrier to the provision of
housing opportunities commensurate with regional needs. It
gradually became apparent, through a variety of different fac-
tual situations, that the invalidation of zoning provisions, in
and of itself, would not bring about the housing opportunities
needed. The attention of housing advocates has, inevitably,
been increasingly directed toward the fashioning of remedies
that would by necessity, reach beyond ordinance invalidation
to address the substantive issue underlying the litigation.
The substantive issue underlying the course of exclusion-
ary zoning litigation, and the manner of its resolution, were
well-stated in the Mount Laurel I decision:
The legal question before us . . . is whether a devel-
oping municipality like Mount Laurel may validly, by a
system of land use regulation, make it physically and eco-
nomically impossible to provide low and moderate income
housing in the municipality for the various categories of
persons who need and want it and thereby, as Mount
Laurel has, exclude such people from living within its
5. Note, Developments in. the Law - Zoning, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1427, 1626-28
(1978).
6. 67 N.J. 151, 188, 336 A.2d 713, 732 (1975) (Mount Laurel I).
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confines because of the limited extent of their income and
resources....
We conclude that every such municipality must, by
its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically
possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing.
More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the
opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low
and moderate income housing and in its regulations must
affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the ex-
tent of the municipality's fair share of the present and
prospective regional need therefor.'
The decision made it clear that the fundamental issue was
housing opportunity for people otherwise excluded. Technical
insufficiency of specific ordinance standards was not the issue.
The opinion emphasized that appropriate variety and choice
of housing through the municipality's land use regulations was
no more than a means to that end.
A body of legal doctrine oriented toward achievement of a
social or economic objective that has been established as a
matter of public policy, whether with respect to school deseg-
regation, employment discrimination, or exclusionary zoning,
must, by necessity, address more than the technical features
of the law at issue. It must operate with a clearheaded under-
standing of the extralegal issues which determine whether a
legal ruling will accomplish its purpose. In the case of exclu-
sionary zoning, the central extralegal dimensions are found in
specific economic and social considerations: in the interplay
between economic reality, social pressures, and the informal
and largely discretionary system of local land use regulation
which determines what housing will or will not be built in a
community, and for whom housing opportunity will actually
be provided. This complex interplay is amenable to resolution.
Indeed, the experience in New Jersey since the 1983 decision
in Mount Laurel II, demonstrates that the resolution lies
within the means and resources available to both state judi-
7. Id. at 173-74, 336 A.2d at 724. Although the question of fair share may be
raised, it is not directly germane to the focus of this article and is, therefore, not
examined here.
1986]
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ciaries and legislatures seeking to address this issue.
The New York State judiciary has sought to address ex-
clusionary zoning since the court of appeals first framed the
problem in Berenson v. Town of New Castle,8 in 1975. Part II
of this article addresses the effect of a line of decisions, at the
trial and appellate levels, which have not only failed to clarify
the doctrine first enunciated in Berenson, but have gradually
restructured it in such a way that today it appears to be in
serious danger of disappearing entirely - not through explicit
re-evaluation or reversal, but through a process of judicial ero-
sion. The most significant element in the disintegration pro-
cess has been the failure of the courts to address the interplay
of the law with economic reality and the relationship of the
formal to the informal, or discretionary, land use regulatory
system. Recognition of these realities and a willingness to di-
rectly and explicitly address them must undergird serious
analysis of the exclusionary zoning issue.
Parts III and IV of this article are devoted to an exposi-
tion of the relationship between zoning regulations and the
administration of the zoning process on the one hand, and de-
velopment of housing to meet regional needs, on the other
hand. The final section, Part V, addresses the feasibility of
framing land use control provisions which are responsive to
the economic realities acting upon them and which affirma-
tively work to address the regional housing needs which were
the subject of the Berenson and Mount Laurel cases.
II. Zoning and Economic Reality in New York State
Exclusionary Zoning Case Law
A. Framing Public Policy: The Berenson Decision
The position of the New York State judiciary with re-
spect to exclusionary zoning was first enunciated in the 1975
court of appeals decision in Berenson9 This decision was not
a ruling on the merits of plaintiff's case, but, rather, a decision
8. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
9. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
[Vol. 4
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affirming the denial of summary judgment motions and re-
manding the case to the trial court for a plenary trial.10 The
court established a two-prong test for the validity of a munici-
pal zoning ordinance:
The first branch of the test, then, is simply whether the
board has provided a properly balanced and well ordered
plan for the community ... the court must ascertain
what types of housing presently exist in New Castle, their
quantity and quality, and whether this array adequately
meets the present needs of the town. Also, it must be de-
termined whether new construction is necessary to fulfill
the future needs of New Castle residents, and if so, what
forms the new developments ought to take.
Secondly, in enacting a zoning ordinance, considera-
tion must be given to regional needs and requirements. It
may be true, for example, that New Castle already has a
sufficient number of multiple-dwelling units to satisfy
both its present and future populations. However, resi-
dents of Westchester County, as well as the larger New
York City metropolitan region, may be searching for mul-
tiple-family housing in the area to be near their employ-
ment or for a variety of other social and economic rea-
sons. There must be a balancing of the local desire to
maintain the status quo within the community and the
greater public interest that regional needs be met."
The first prong is similar to traditional zoning cases although
a modification of traditional practice lies in the provision ad-
dressing the future needs of households already resident in
the community.'2
10. Id. at 102, 341 N.E.2d at 239, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
11. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 249, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81 (citation omitted).
12. This recognition of internally generated housing needs is comparable to the
concept of "indigenous need" enunciated in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 214-15, 456 A.2d 390, 418 (1983)(Mount
Laurel II). It would appear to have been interpreted in much the same way by the
appellate division in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 519-20, 415
N.Y.S.2d 669, 677 (1979). It has been, however, largely ignored by the trial courts in
subsequent zoning decisions. The issue of whether a municipality has an explicit re-
sponsibility to meet the housing needs of its present residents living in deficient hous-
ing, as clearly implied from Berenson, is far from a trivial matter. Most suburban
1986]
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The more substantial departure from tradition was the
court's adoption of the regional housing need standard as the
second prong of the test.13 At the same time, as if slightly in-
timidated by their own audacity, the court created a potential
loophole in the doctrine, offering municipalities a means of es-
caping their regional obligations, by holding that
[w]hile regional needs are a valid consideration in zoning
... a town need not permit a use solely for the sake of
the people of the region if regional needs are presently
provided for in an adequate manner. Thus, for example, if
New Castle's neighbors supply enough multiple-dwelling
units or land to build such units to satisfy New Castle's
need as well as their own, there would be no obligation on
New Castle's part to provide more, assuming there is no
overriding regional need.'
This provision did not, in the final analysis, affect the out-
come of the Berenson case, except with respect to its implica-
tions for the adoption of the "fair share" doctrine by the New
York courts in subsequent litigation. 15
municipalities contain, at the very least, pockets of lower income populations, often
living in severely substandard housing conditions, whose needs have rarely been ad-
dressed by those municipalities. This issue, independent of regional housing needs,
was explicitly noted in Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
13. It is worth noting that Berenson was foreshadowed, to a limited extent, by
the New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), where, while upholding a complex growth man-
agement scheme enacted by the town, the court pointed out that "[wihat we will not
countenance, then, under any guise, is community efforts at immunization or exclu-
sion." Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152. This decision also focused
to some extent on a municipality's obligations to share in the growth triggered by
regional housing demands. Id. at 375, 379, 285 N.E.2d at 299-300, 302-03, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 149, 152-53. The general language of Golden notwithstanding, there is no
question that the court of appeals fashioned a doctrine new to New York State law in
Berenson; a doctrine, indeed, as pointed out by one leading commentator, directly
grounded in the freshly minted Mount Laurel I decision. 3 N. Williams, American
Planning Law: Land Use and the Police Power § 66.19 (1974 & Supp. 1982).
14. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
15. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491
N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985). It has, however, significantly affected the outcome of at least
one other exclusionary zoning case, where it was applied by the Appellate Division,
Second Department, in particularly outrageous fashion. See North Shore Unitarian
[Vol. 4
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On remand, the trial court found the New Castle zoning
ordinance failed both prongs of the Berenson test. Conse-
quently, the trial court ordered the town to amend its zoning
ordinance to permit the construction of at least three thou-
sand five hundred units of multi-family housing by December
31, 1987 (ten years from the trial judgment) and grant the re-
zoning of plaintiff's property at a density of eight units per
acre.1 6 The trial judgment was appealed by the town. The de-
cision of the appellate division was handed down in April,
1979.17
While affirming the trial court's findings with respect to
the inadequacies of the New Castle zoning ordinance, and or-
dering plaintiff's land rezoned for multi-family housing at an
unspecified density, 8 the appellate division took strong issue
with the trial court's application of the fair share principle to
the case; that is, the establishment of a numerical goal for the
construction of multi-family housing in the municipality. In so
doing, the appellate court relied heavily on its own assessment
of the lack of substance to the fair share evidence presented
at. trial, characterizing it as "highly abstract and specula-
tive,"" and on the similar conclusions of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court with respect to fair share in the 1977 Oakwood
at Madison v. Township of Madison decision.2 0 More substan-
tially, the court pointed out the fallacy of a fair share number
derived from the housing needs of the population as a whole
rather than a number based on the needs of the specific needs
of the lower income population, noting that
Universalist Soc'y v. Village of Upper Brookville, 110 A.D.2d 123, 493 N.Y.S.2d 768
(1985).
16. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, Index No. 4239/73 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 6,
1977). This opinion is discussed at length in N. Williams, supra note 13. An edited
version of the opinion appears in D. Mandelker & R. Cunningham, Planning and
Control of Land Development 554-62 (1979).
17. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979).
18. Id. at 523-24, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 680. The appellate division, however, reversed
on the specific density awarded by the trial court and referred the matter to the town
board to be considered as a part of the rezoning application to be filed for the site.
The density for the site was set eventually at three units per acre.
19. Id. at 520, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
20. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
19861
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The court apparently failed to appreciate that the figure
itself was referable to the housing market in general, both
as to income groups and the type of housing (single or
multi-family) to be provided, and was not directly refera-
ble to the needs of the low income groups with which the
court was primarily concerned .... Special Term's judg-
ment cannot and does not insure that any of the multi-
family units to be constructed will be anything other than
luxury condominiums, with which the market may al-
ready be saturated.21
The court's economic reasoning appears unsound, in that it is
difficult to imagine a rational developer continuing to build
additional luxury condominiums in a saturated market. The
court, however, clearly understood the distinction between
multi-family housing generally and housing which meets the
needs of the lower income population in particular.
In an important passage, the appellate division concluded
that, in any event, economic conditions would make it impos-
sible to meet those needs, at least to any significant extent:
The town's contention that multi-family rental housing
(the type most affordable by persons of low and moderate
income) cannot be constructed today even with govern-
mental subsidies unless the land is publicly owned or fig-
ured at zero cost is not without some merit, especially if
we are talking about providing lower income housing in
sizable quantities.22
This is an unfortunate, and erroneous, conclusion. It appears
that the court may have uncritically accepted extremely
doubtful testimony. Indeed, the town's contention, far from
having merit, was patently self-serving, and factually incorrect
at two levels. First, all governmental housing subsidy pro-
grams have been based on the premise that, as a general rule,
units would be built on privately owned land acquired for that
purpose, and, therefore, would include the cost of land acqui-
21. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 520-21, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
22. Id. at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
[Vol. 4
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sition as a permissible element in total project cost.2 Second,
the court appears to have confused multi-family rental hous-
ing generally, much of which is constructed without subsidy,
with subsidized housing. One need not, however, fault the
court too severely for accepting the town's contention, partic-
ularly in view of the not dissimilar, although considerably less
far-reaching, conclusions reached in the Madison decision, a
decision on which the appellate division heavily relied.24
In the final analysis, the appellate division found the ap-
plication of the fair share principle was precluded as a matter
of law and that, aside from the general lack of authority for
such a far-reaching step,
[iun holding that New Castle could validly exclude multi-
family housing if its neighboring communities provided a
sufficient number of such units, or the land upon which
they could be built, to satisfy their own, New Castle's,
and the regional needs, the Court of Appeals impliedly
held that New Castle per se did not have to bear any 'fair
share' of any such housing burden.2"
Although this conclusion is hardly dictated by the earlier lan-
guage of the court of appeals, it is not an entirely illogical re-
23. This is not to suggest that subsidized housing projects can sustain unlimited
land acquisition costs. Indeed, on many occasions would-be developers of subsidized
projects in suburban areas, even where suitable zoning exists, find themselves at a
serious disadvantage compared to developers of market housing, because the cost
constraints of the program will not allow them to pay what may well be the market
value of the land. It should be noted, however, that under the 1974 Federal Commu-
nity Development Block Grant Program, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-5320 (West 1983), pre-
sumably known to the experts in the Berenson case, federal funds are available to
local governments for a wide variety of activities in support of lower income housing
generally, one of which is the acquisition of privately owned land for development of
lower income housing. See H. Franklin, D. Falk & A. Levin, In-Zoning: A Guide for
Policy Makers on Inclusionary Land Use Programs 59-69, 181-82 (1974); Suburban
Action Inst., Housing Choice: A Handbook for Suburban Officials, Non-Profit Organi-
zations, Community Groups and Consumers 36-53 (undated) (prepared by M.
Brooks). This handbook includes specific examples of successful land acquisition
programs.
24. See Berenson, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669; Oakwood at Madison v.
Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 510-14, 371 A.2d 1192, 1206-08 (1977).
25. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
19861
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sponse to that court's language. The appellate division, how-
ever, did not address the question of how it practically could
be determined whether the neighboring communities were in-
deed providing a sufficient number of units to satisfy regional
needs, unless some type of fair share approach was imple-
mented. Indeed, the general language calling for the courts to
"assess the reasonableness of what the locality has done,"26
provides no guidance concerning how a court is even to begin
to evaluate whether a municipality is in compliance with the
Berenson doctrine.
One major problem with adjudicating the Berenson case,
pointed out at some length by the appellate division, is the
fundamental incongruity of a case brought by a developer
seeking to construct expensive condominium units hinging on
the question of whether the municipal zoning ordinance ade-
quately provides for regional housing needs, particularly those
of low and moderate income households. There is no question
that the appellate division saw the case in those terms. The
court went to great lengths to distinguish Berenson from
those suits brought by would-be developers of multi-family
housing in which no more than "competing parochial inter-
ests" were involved.2 7 Even if the court had been presented
with evidence suggesting there were practical means toward
providing lower income housing, there was no plaintiff in the
case seeking a remedy directed at meeting low and moderate
income housing needs.
Thus, once Berenson was assured of his rezoning, the case
was effectively over. Although, in ordering the town to remedy
its zoning deficiencies, the appellate division provided that
the trial court would retain jurisdiction "for the purpose of
allowing the plaintiffs to challenge the sufficiency of any
amended ordinance by supplemental pleadings."28 There was
not a single plaintiff in the case who could have been expected
to challenge any ordinance deficiencies other than those af-
26. Id. at 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 679 (citing Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38
N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975)).
27. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 515, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
28. Id. at 523, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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fecting the Berenson tract, or, including Berenson himself,
who would have had standing to do so. No further litigation
took place in this matter.2"
The amended New Castle zoning ordinance was upheld in
the face of a subsequent challenge. Once again, the plaintiff
was a landowner whose fundamental interests did not extend
beyond his holdings. Blitz v. Town of New Castle,30 had some
modest significance, as it was one of a small number of cases
decided by the New York courts between 1979 and 1985 which
applied the Berenson standards, and in the process substan-
tially narrowed what had appeared, in 1975, to be the salient
holdings of the New York Court of Appeals.
B. Narrowing the Issues: Kurzius, Blitz and North Shore
Unitarian Universalist Society
Unlike the 1975 Mount Laurel I decision in New Jersey,
which triggered a substantial flow of exclusionary zoning cases
during the following few years, the New York Court of Ap-
peals Berenson decision of the same year generated only a
trickle of subsequent cases seeking to apply that doctrine to
other communities. During the ten year period between the
court of appeals decision in Berenson and the recent decision
of the appellate division in Suffolk Housing Services v. Town
of Brookhaven,"1 only four cases seeking to apply the Beren-
son doctrine were reported, one of which dealt with issues
29. In 1985, an article in the New York Times, announcing at long last that de-
velopment had begun on the Berenson tract, noted that:
Although the intention of the original suit, initiated by Mitchell Berenson,
was to open the town to lower and middle income residents, subsequent
multi-family development in Chappaqua has produced relatively expensive
condominiums. The new community, to be known as Old Farms at Chappa-
qua, is no exception. Prices will range from $183,000 to $290,000 for the one,
two, and three bedroom town houses.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1985, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1. As we have seen, of course the
intention of the Berenson suit was not to create opportunities for the lower- and
middle-income residents. The issue of low- and moderate-income housing needs was,
arguably, no more than a means by which Berenson was able to create a more
favorable legal climate for the multi-family rezoning he sought, for the ultimate pur-
pose of constructing expensive condominium units.
30. 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1983).
31. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985).
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largely unrelated to exclusionary zoning.32 Furthermore, not
one of the three remaining zoning cases was a particularly
good vehicle through which to expand or refine the Berenson
doctrine. Each of the three cases nevertheless represented a
step in a process by which the New York judiciary appeared
to distance itself from any serious effort to grapple with the
substantive implications of Berenson. The court seemed eager
to seize upon any available pretext to avoid engaging with the
issues of regional housing needs and the obligations of local
government in the exercise of their land use powers.
Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville"
was brought by a landowner seeking to have his holdings re-
zoned from five-acre to two-acre lots.3 4 Although plaintiff was
successful in the appellate division, that decision was reversed
by the court of appeals. Berenson was regularly invoked by all
parties to this case, but it was hardly a serious Berenson case.
As the court of appeals noted:
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that . . . pressing re-
gional needs were ignored in formulating the ordinance.
There was no proof that persons of low or moderate in-
comes were foreclosed from housing in the region because
of an unavailability of properly zoned land. In fact, there
was no showing of need in the village for lots of less than
32. The fourth reported case grounded in Berenson is Allen v. North Hemp-
stead, 103 A.D.2d 144, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1984), in which a zoning ordinance provi-
sion which imposed a durational residency requirement as a condition for occupying
senior citizen housing built under the ordinance was struck down as being in violation
of the Berenson doctrine. There have been a number of unreported trial decisons in
matters brought by developers. One, which may well be the only such case outside the
Town of New Castle in which a plaintiff has succeeded in having the Berenson doc-
trine applied, is 208 E. 30th St. Corp. v. North Salem, 88 A.D.2d 281, 452 N.Y.S.2d
902 (1982) (ruling on appeal of certain narrow procedural issues arising from this
decision). Another, Froelich v. Town of Huntington, No. 82/7008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
27, 1983), resulted in the landowner succeeding in part on other grounds, but losing
on his Berenson claims. It would appear with respect to Froelich, as has been true in
other cases, that the Berenson claim was included largely to add weight to the land-
owner's conventional arguments, in this case relating largely to a taking claim, rather
than as a central element of the case.
33. 67 A.D.2d 70, 414 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680,
434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
34. See Kurzius, 67 A.D.2d at 71-75, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
[Vol. 4
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five acres."'
While the absence of an affirmative housing case suggests
that Kurzius fails to represent a true Berenson case, the court
of appeals holding is indicative of a position unsympathetic to
plaintiffs challenging local zoning ordinances on exclusionary
grounds. The court's characterization of the need issue is one
dimensional. Its comment that "there was no showing of need
* .. for lots of less than five acres"5 is both unnecessary and
inconsistent with common sense. 7 The comment implicitly
embodies a proposition with significant implications, namely,
that in order to prevail plaintiff would not only have to prove
a generalized unmet housing need but also a highly specific
need for precisely the housing he would be providing - in
Kurzius, houses on two acre rather than five acre lots. This
proposition places plaintiffs in a difficult, perhaps impossible,
35. Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 346, 414 N.E.2d at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184 (citation
omitted). Apparently, there was no trial testimony on any of these points, plaintiff
relying entirely on testimony that the Upper Brookville zoning ordinance had been
enacted with exclusionary intent - a contention accepted by the appellate division,
but rejected by the court of appeals. This is a particularly troubling aspect of the
court of appeals decision. The appellate division went to considerable lengths to sup-
port its conclusion that the enactment of the ordinance had been with exclusionary
purpose. See Kurzius, 67 A.D.2d at 71-73, 78-79, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75, 578-79. This
aspect of the record was casually dismissed by the court of appeals, which concluded
that "[tihe record shows clearly that the purpose of the ordinance was to preserve the
open-space areas of the village, which may be a legitimate goal of multiacre zoning."
Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 346, 414 N.E. at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184. This decision has
been severely criticized by one commentator, who has pointed out the extent to which
it "suggests the ease with which a community might disguise its discriminatory intent
in euphemistic references to 'open space zoning'." Mayo, Land Use Control, 33 Syra-
cuse L. Rev. 401, 409-10 (1982). Plaintiffs failure to present a substantive housing
case prompted T. Mayo to note that "to ensure success in exclusionary zoning litiga-
tion, the elements of the Berenson case may not merely be invoked." Id. at 408.
36. Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at 346, 414 N.E.2d at 684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
37. It should be stressed that the author is not suggesting, in the absence of a
record below, that the court of appeals should have found a particular housing need
in the Village of Upper Brookville. Common sense suggests, however, that in all but
the most unusual community there is some need for housing more modest than that
which can be built on a five acre lot, a point which the court could have acknowl-
edged without having to modify its conclusions with regard to the specific claim made
by plaintiffs. Alternatively, it would not have been inappropriate for the court to re-
mand the case for a new hearing, in which plaintiffs would have the opportunity to
present factual testimony on regional housing needs.
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position when trying to establish a winning Berenson case.
Shortly after the decision in Kurzius a second challenge
to the zoning of Upper Brookville was made in North Shore
Unitarian Universalist Society v. Village of Upper Brook-
ville.3 8 Plaintiff in this case, a religious establishment, was
seeking to construct congregate living facilities for elderly
members of the society,39 on a site reasonably accessible to the
church as well as within a rural setting."' After losing in the
trial court in 1983,41 plaintiff appealed. Judgment affirming
the trial court ruling was handed down by the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department, in 1985.
In North Shore, plaintiff relied heavily on the evidence of
a substantial and quantified regional need for multi-family
housing identified in the Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive De-
velopment Plan,42 as well as evidence of a general but not spe-
cifically quantified need for senior citizen housing.43 The vil-
lage argued that a variety of regional planning studies had
found that in order to preserve open space and significant
water resources, future development in the village should be
at very low densities.4 In finding for the village, the appellate
38. No. 10982/80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1983), afj'd, 110 A.D.2d 123, 493
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1985).
39. Congregate living facilities for senior citizens are those which provide, in ad-
dition to independent living quarters, common dining facilities and supportive health
services.
40. North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Village of Upper Brookville, No.
10982/80 at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1983).
41. The trial decision in this case was characterized by a nearly total absence of
either legal reasoning or analysis of the issues one would expect to be addressed
under the Berenson doctrine. Instead, the decision was grounded primarily on the
apparent conviction of the court that the site proposed by the church was unsuitable
for the proposed use by virtue of its remoteness from existing community and com-
mercial facilities. Id. at 8-10. On that basis the court concluded "with regard for the
established need for senior citizen housing, Defendant's ordinance is reasonable in
that Defendant lacks the type of attributes and facilities which are peculiarly neces-
sary for the elderly." Id. at 10-11. Given the difficulty of acquiring sites at reasonable
cost for such purposes, a legal requirement that any site must be of outstanding suit-
ability to pass muster simply imposes yet another unreasonable hurdle on any plain-
tiff seeking the opportunity to build in an unsupportive municipality.
42. Prepared by the Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board (1969).
43. North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Village of Upper Brookville, No.
10982/80 at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1983).
44. See North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Village of Upper Brookville,
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division gave great weight to the regional studies"" and, ad-
dressing the second prong of the Berenson doctrine, found
that the need for sixty-two thousand five hundred multi-fam-
ily units in Nassau County had already been met:
A planning coordinator for the Long Island Regional
Planning Board testified that if the sites [outside the Vil-
lage of Upper Brookville] shown on the Plan were used at
the recommended densities, the creation of the 62,500
units could be accomplished. Accordingly, the record
shows that the village zoning ordinance serves a regional
need for open space and water preservation, and that the
regional need for multi-unit housing is supplied by other
areas in the county. Thus, the burden of proof on the sec-
ond prong of the Berenson test has not been met."
In reaching this conclusion, however, the court was forced
to apply a complex and tortured reasoning process, which is
significant in view of its potential implications for future ex-
clusionary zoning litigation. Acknowledging that the needed
number of multi-family units had not been constructed and
that the regional housing needs had not in actuality been met,
the court made two points. First, "[z]oning ordinances will go
no further than determining what may or may not be built;
110 A.D.2d 123, 127, 493 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (1985).
45. An example of the misuse of such studies by the court appears in the state-
ment "[tihe village also lies in an area designated as Zone One by a water manage-
ment study, which recommends one dwelling unit or less per acre to protect the
groundwater from future pollutant loadings." Id. at 127, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567. The
study referenced by the court is the Long Island Regional Plan. Bd., Long Island
Comprehensive Waste Treatment Management Plan, (1978). A reading of that docu-
ment establishes: (1) Zone One, rather than encompassing a small and tightly defined
area, encompasses more than half of Nassau County and a substantial part of West-
ern Suffolk County, most of which is already developed at densities greater than one
unit per acre, id. at 45; (2) similar or more stringent density recommendations are
made in the report for all other areas on Long Island not already sewered, id. at 163-
67; (3) these recommendations are clearly applicable only to unsewered development,
using septic systems, rather than development that would either connect to an ex-
isting system, or construct a project sewerage treatment facility, id. Thus, the inter-
pretation of this document by the court, if generally applied, would effectively bar all
multi-family development from virtually all parts of Long Island.
46. North Shore, 110 A.D.2d at 127, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
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market forces will decide what will actually be built, in the
absence of government subsidies. '47 Second, "a requirement
that those seeking to build either multi-family housing or age
restricted multi-family housing must first seek a permit to do
so does not destroy the presumptive validity of zoning ordi-
nances which do not premap to provide for such housing. '
This reasoning expands the Berenson loophole to the point
where almost any exclusionary municipality can easily argue
that regional housing needs are being adequately met else-
where. The court specifically held that neither proof of the
existence of multi-family units nor proof that suitably zoned
land in neighboring municipalities exists is needed for this
conclusion to be reached. All that is necessary is the theoreti-
cal possibility that developers could apply for their land to be
rezoned for multi-family use.4 9
47. Id. at 128, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (quoting Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94
A.D.2d 92, 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1983)).
48. North Shore, 110 A.D.2d at 128, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
49. Indeed, the possibility is no more than theoretical, since it is unlikely in the
extreme that adequate suitable sites remain in the areas designated for potential
multi-family rezoning in the Comprehensive Development Plan. In a more recent
study of vacant land, a figure of 17,319 vacant acres is given for Nassau County. Long
Island Regional Plan. Bd., Land-Use-1981, at 10 [hereinafter Land-Use-1981]. This
figure clearly is inconsistent with the conclusion of the 1969 Comprehensive Develop-
ment Plan that there "are less than 15,000 acres of vacant land in all of Nassau
County," quoted in North Shore, 110 A.D.2d at 126, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 566. Most of the
apparent discrepancy is attributable to a change in practice. The earlier study
counted large estates as residential land in their entirety, while the later analysis
assigned the building to a portion of such property, considering the balance to be
vacant. See Land Use - 1981, supra. This is a more realistic approach. Of the 17,300
vacant acres thus identified, however, over 10,400, or roughly sixty percent, are in the
north shore area in which Upper Brookville is located. A review of the land use maps
for Nassau County suggests that no more than a handful of small, scattered, vacant
sites exist today (or existed at the time of trial) within the centers and corridors
designated as appropriate in 1969 for multi-family development by the Comprehen-
sive Development Plan. It is not clear whether testimony on any of these issues was
presented by either party at trial. If such testimony was given, its presence is not
reflected in the opinion of the court. Furthermore, the regional plan has no legal sta-
tus with respect to the land use decisions of local government. The fact that a site is
designated for multi-family use on the Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive Development
Plan does not carry with it the slightest inference that the municipality within which
it is located will even entertain, let alone grant, a proposal for rezoning. Interestingly,
this question has arisen in a case tried in May 1985, and awaiting decision in federal
court, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 81 CV. 0541 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1985)
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The use of regional plans by the courts in these cases is
troubling. In North Shore, the appellate division supported its
reliance on the Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive Development
Plan with references to the Regional Development Guide of
the Tristate Regional Planning Commission, a highly genera-
lized document issued by a body which had been dissolved a
number of years prior to the decision. In the Blitz appellate
division decision, in which the validity of New Castle's post-
Berenson zoning ordinance was affirmed, the court placed
heavy reliance on a housing policy document prepared by an
unspecified "blue ribbon committee" of private citizens on be-
half of the County of Westchester."0 This document is power-
less to bind local governments. At best it is of no more than a
quasi-governmental character.
The Berenson court made a strong plea for regional plan-
ning of a particular order:
[I]t is quite anomalous that a court should be required to
perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we
look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes in
order to foster the development of programs designed to
achieve sound regional planning. While the people of New
Castle may fervently desire to be left alone by the forces
of change, the ultimate determination is not solely theirs.
Whether New Castle should be permitted to exclude high
density residential development depends on the facts and
circumstances present in the town and the community at
large. Until the day comes where regional, rather than
local, governmental units can make such determinations,
the courts must assess the reasonableness of what the lo-
(decision pending). The issue in the case was the denial by the town of a request for
multi-family rezoning of a site owned by a nonprofit sponsor, where the objective of
the sponsor was to construct subsidized housing under the then active federal Section
8 program (Housing and Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1982)).
Although the site was designated for high density development in the Nassau-Suffolk
Comprehensive Development Plan, defendants took the position that that designa-
tion is irrelevant, and that the low-density designation in the town master plan (1964)
is the only relevant planning standard. See Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, at
56-57, Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, No. 81 CV. 0541 (ILG),
(submitted July 31, 1985).
50. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 97, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (1983).
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cality has done."
This passage leaves little doubt that the court of appeals was
seeking the enactment of legislation that would provide for ra-
tional decision making at a regional level, not merely the
preparation of toothless advisory and exhortative reports.
There have been no statutory enactments since Berenson to
that end. The legislative authorization for the plans relied
upon by the appellate division in North Shore, such as it was,
was in place long before the Berenson decision. By relying so
heavily on regional studies, the appellate division is promoting
the patently unsound doctrine that these documents have
some direct and significant relationship to the local land use
regulatory process. The court is evading its judicial responsi-
bilities and perpetuating an image of the land use regulatory
process wildly at variance with reality.
Even more troubling, however, is the judicial view of the
relationship between zoning and development that emerges in
these decisions. The courts see zoning as a passive and nar-
rowly technical procedure. 52 While they recognize that a fail-
ure to zone for multi-family housing (by which they appear to
mean the utter absence of such a zoning text in the ordinance)
is a barrier to construction of such housing, the recognition of
the relationship between zoning and development goes no fur-
ther. The courts have assumed a series of idealized relation-
ships: once the appropriate text has been placed in the ordi-
nance, to the extent market conditions alone dictate, multi-
family development will follow; should governmental subsidies
be available subsidized housing will follow; regional housing
needs will be met, or not met, on the basis of the workings of
market forces and the availability of subsidies. This view dis-
torts the relationship between zoning and development at sev-
51. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975).
52. As the appellate division held in Blitz, "zoning ordinances will go no further
than determining what may or may not be built; market forces will decide what will
actually be built in the absence of government subsidies." Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 99, 463
N.Y.S.2d at 836, quoted in North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Village of
Upper Brookville, 110 A.D.2d 123, 128, 493 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (1985).
[Vol. 4
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eral levels. Where the zoning process is highly discretionary,
as is the case whenever multi-family districts are not mapped
but rezoned only on application of a landowner, the market
can easily be thwarted and manipulated by the exercise of
governmental discretion. Even where vacant land is zoned for
multi-family development prior to any application, the condi-
tions imposed by the ordinance can still affect the nature of
development in ways that would not be the outcome of mar-
ket factors. The effect on the likelihood of subsidized housing
being constructed is even greater. By seeing the development
of lower income housing as a simple matter of the application
of governmental subsidies to a neutral zoning ordinance two
essential elements are ignored. The extent to which the zoning
process can impede the provision of lower income housing,
even where subsidies are available, is the first element. The
second is the extent, in the absence of governmental subsidies,
that zoning can affirmatively help to bring about the provision
of low and moderate income housing.
It is arguable that, at least in 1975, the provision of lower
income housing was of some concern to the New York courts,
and that initially the Berenson decision was generally inter-
preted in that light. Thus, the manner in which zoning affects
lower income housing, over and above its effect on multi-fam-
ily housing in general, would appear to be of some legal signif-
icance. It is clearly of social and economic significance because
there is no question that it is, as the appellate division ac-
knowledged in Blitz, the most pressing housing need.53 Fur-
thermore, to a far greater extent than with respect to market
housing, both the zoning provisions themselves and the
manner in which they are administered can either impede or
facilitate the development of lower income housing. The expe-
rience in New Jersey since Mount Laurel II has demonstrated
that carefully crafted zoning provisions can lead to substantial
53. Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (referring to Berenson v. Town of
New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 519-21, 415 N.Y.S.2d, 669, 677-78 (1979)). There is sub-
stantial literature documenting the extent to which housing needs are particularly
severe among lower income households. See, e.g., Report of the President's Comm'n
on Housing 3-11 (W.F. McKenna, chair 1982).
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amounts of lower income housing being produced even in the
absence of governmental subsidies. This is in dramatic con-
trast to the assumptions embodied in the pessimistic dicta
found in the New York decisions.
C. Suffolk Housing Services: The End of the Road for
Berenson?
With respect to addressing the underlying issue of re-
gional housing needs, particularly those of lower income
households, the cases discussed above were deficient in one
particular aspect, namely, the character and the concerns of
the parties bringing the litigation. In Berenson, Blitz and
Kurzius, plaintiffs were landowners whose motivation for liti-
gating was first and foremost to bring about a substantial in-
crease in the value of their land. In Berenson, plaintiffs
presented extensive trial testimony on the relevant social is-
sues. Those issues were not addressed at all in Kurzius, and
only minimally in Blitz. The plaintiff in North Shore was a
legitimate nonprofit entity, but its concerns were still of a spe-
cial and parochial nature with little relevance to broader
housing needs." None of these cases, therefore, offered any
serious direction regarding the question of how regional hous-
ing needs were to be most effectively reflected in municipal
land use regulation. In essence, the issue of regional housing
needs was no more than a means by which plaintiffs could ob-
tain the site-specific relief they were seeking. In that respect,
Mitchell Berenson was successful, but his successors, Robert
Kurzius, Joseph Blitz and the North Shore Unitarian Univer-
salist Society were not.
The first Berenson case to address regional housing needs
as the central element of the case was Suffolk Housing Ser-
54. The nature of the North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society's goals with
respect to the proposed housing was highly specific: to provide housing exclusively for
elderly members of the congregation (who were, by and large, relatively affluent) in
reasonable proximity to the church and in a rural setting. Given this, the trial court
reasonably concluded that "senior citizen housing [of the sort proposed by the plain-
tiff] is not a 'need' in the sense that it is not particularly utilitarian in social and
economic terms." North Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc'y v. Inc. Village of Upper
Brookville, No. 10982/80 at 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1983).
(Vol. 4
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vices v. Town of Brookhaven, a case brought by a coalition of
low income individuals and organizations concerned with
lower income housing needs against a rapidly growing subur-
ban town in Suffolk County on Long Island. As is typical of
such cases, it had a lengthy history. First brought in 1976, it
withstood a challenge to plaintiffs' standing, in an important
decision by special term, 5 affirmed by the appellate division
in 1978.56 The case was tried in 1980 and a decision was ren-
dered for the Town of Brookhaven in the fall of 1982." The
appellate division affirmed the trial decision in an opinion
handed down in July 1985."8 As of this writing, the court of
appeals has granted a motion for leave to appeal submitted by
the plaintiffs."'
The Town of Brookhaven, reputedly the largest town in
the United States, has an area of three hundred forty square
miles, 60 which is substantially larger than the entire land area
of New York City,61 and is roughly three quarters of the area
of Westchester County, in which the Town of New Castle is
located.2 Brookhaven has experienced rapid suburban growth
during recent decades. Its population in 1980 was 364,812.63
55. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc.2d 80, 397 N.Y.S.2d
302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
56. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 63 A.D.2d 731 405 N.Y.S.2d 302
(1978).
57. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 75-20017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 17, 1982).
58. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d
396 (1985).
59. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven (July 1, 1986) (order granting
leave to appeal). It is interesting to note that a number of diverse organizations
joined in the appeal as amicus curiae, including the American Planning Association,
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the American Jewish Con-
gress, and a number of Long Island religious and civic organizations.
60. Plaintiff's Post-Trial Memorandum at 5, Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of
Brookhaven, No. 75-20017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982) [hereinafter Memorandum].
61. The land area of New York City (five boroughs) is approximately three hun-
dred square miles. Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't, 1984-1985 New York State
Statistical Yearbook 16 (1985).
62. The land area of Westchester County is approximately four hundred thirty-
eight square miles. Id.
63. 34 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Popula-
tion: General Population Characteristics, 34-19 (1982).
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The population of the town, while substantial, was distributed
over a large area. As a result, development patterns in the
town were typically those of low density single-family housing,
interspersed with highway-oriented shopping strips, and
nearly half of the town was either still vacant or in agricul-
tural use." Only 3.3 % of the town population was black,65 the
greater part of whom were concentrated in two small enclaves
of heavily minority character. 6
In contrast to Berenson, plaintiffs in Suffolk Housing
Services did not allege that multi-family housing was com-
pletely barred from the Town of Brookhaven, but, rather, that
"it is so restricted as to exclude the poor and racial minori-
ties."67 While a variety of exclusionary practices were alleged
as the basis for that conclusion, the central issue was the man-
ner in which the approval took place, on those occasions that
multi-family development was approved by the town. Specifi-
cally, although Brookhaven has created a number of multi-
family zoning districts within its zoning ordinance,68 it has fol-
lowed an explicit practice of refraining from mapping any va-
cant land for any of these multi-family zones. Instead, land is
only designated for multi-family use on petition for rezoning
by a developer or landowner.6 9 Such a rezoning can only take
place after an extensive and largely duplicative review by both
the town planning board and the town board. 70 Thus, there is
no opportunity to develop multi-family housing as of right.
Development can only take place as a result of favorable exer-
cise of discretion by the municipal governing body. Although
there are certain generalized planning criteria for the applica-
64. Land Use - 1981, supra note 49, at 21.
65. 34 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Popula-
tion: General Population Characteristics, 34-40 (1982).
66. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 17-18.
67. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc.2d 80, 81, 397
N.Y.S.2d 302, 305 (1977).
68. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 75-20017 at 13-15 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982).
69. Defendant's Brief After Trial at 31-32, Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of
Brookhaven, No. 75-20017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982).
70. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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tion of these multi-family zones written in the ordinance,71
they are vague and have no binding effect on the determina-
tion of the town board. Similarly, the town board is not bound
by the recommendation of the planning board. Indeed, those
recommendations have been ignored as often as they have
been accepted.72
This process, plaintiffs alleged, was at the core of a body
of practices which had a chilling effect on development of
multi-family housing generally, which resulted in develop-
ments being approved subject to the imposition of unreasona-
ble or exclusionary conditions not set forth in the ordinance
but imposed as covenants and which effectively discouraged
development of subsidized housing for low and moderate in-
come households."
The town asserted that such a discretionary approach to
multi-family zoning was standard governmental practice,
rather than a local aberration.74 A further, and more impor-
tant contention was noted by plaintiffs in a post-trial
memorandum:
In the course of the trial, the defendants pressed this
Court to adopt a narrow reading of Berenson. The de-
fendants suggested that the Court look only to whether
Brookhaven provided a variety of zoning classifications
and not whether the Town permitted housing types re-
sponsive to the needs of low and moderate income per-
sons. Brookhaven argues that if it has made possible
through its zoning housing in a multi-family form, it has
met its Berenson obligation even if the housing developed
is extremely costly and beyond the means of low and
moderate income persons. As long as the Town rezones
for multi-family use, the fact [that] it excludes subsidized
apartments or requires developers to market multi-family
units in a condominium-sale fashion rather than by rental
71. Town of Brookhaven, N.Y. Zoning Ordinance §§ 85-53A, 85-54 (1976).
72. Trial testimony of Janet Hanson, Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookha-
ven, No. 75-20017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982) (as recalled by the author).
73. See Memorandum, supra note 60, at 66-76.
74. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 75-20017 at 8 & 15 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982).
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is, in the defendants' view, irrelevant."'
Thus, the issue of the nature of the Berenson doctrine was
clearly posed. Plaintiffs argued that
Under the Berenson doctrine, a municipality must show
that its zoning does in fact provide housing opportunities
for low and moderate income persons. The Berenson goal
is not simply the creation of brick and board structures
which bear no relevance to the housing needs of the ex-
cluded classes. A town simply cannot claim compliance on
the basis that it rezones for multi-family construction
when the developments are for the wealthy, while .at the
same time that town refuses to rezone for low income
multi-family subsidized developments.7"
While the trial court found for the defendants, the issue
was not seriously addressed in that decision. The trial court
seemed largely persuaded by the arguments made by one of
the town's expert witnesses that such discretionary zoning was
common practice and that, in any event, zoning had no more
than a minimal effect on housing costs.7" As a result, the court
summarily rejected plaintiffs' contentions regarding the effect
of the town's practices on multi-family development generally
and the housing needs of lower income families particularly.78
The appellate division, however, found for defendants
while largely accepting plaintiffs' contentions. In essence, the
court found that such claims, whether or not true, were irrele-
vant to the application of the Berenson doctrine. First, the
court sought to establish whether the Brookhaven zoning or-
75. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 58.
76. Id.
77. Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 75-20017 at 15 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Sept. 17, 1982).
78. Id. at 16-18. The trial court did note that
[O]ne area that disturbs this Court is the defendants' apparent reluctance to
utilize the various Federal and State subsidy programs that are available to
supplement the development of low cost housing .... The defendants' poli-
cies in this area are under continuing judicial scrutiny, and what is constitu-
tional now may be found to be unconstitutional in the future.
Id. at 18.
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dinance was facially valid. The court concluded it was on the
basis of three separate but related tests:
(1) The language of the ordinance "clearly allows for a
wide variety of different types and densities of residential
housing;
79
(2) The fact that some projects were approved under the
various multi-family zoning categories is adequate to "show
that the special permit procedure has not been employed as a
ruse to prevent the construction of multi-family housing in
the Town of Brookhaven;"80
(3) The availability of substantial remaining vacant land
in the town, coupled with the possibility of additional rezon-
ing for multi-family use, lead to the conclusion "that the ordi-
nance on its face has given more than adequate consideration
to the local and regional housing needs.""1
The court then turned to the meaning of Berenson:
A careful reading of the Court of Appeals decision in Ber-
enson v. Town of New Castle makes clear that the court
therein was not attempting to address the types of ques-
tions sought to be raised by the plaintiffs at bar, since it
approached the problem of exclusionary zoning solely in
terms of traditional zoning and planning considerations,
e.g., population density, infrastructure . . . etc., to the
exclusion of the type of social and economic implications
which the plaintiffs now urge upon us. Thus, Berenson
does not address the question of how such housing is to
be built; what it will cost to develop ... nor does it pur-
port to mandate that a zoning ordinance make it possi-
ble for people of all classes to live in a given community.
It merely requires that a town allow for the construction
of different types of housing in sufficient numbers for
those people who want and can afford it. 2
79. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 328, 491
N.Y.S.2d 396, 400 (1985).
80. Id. at 329, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 401 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 330, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
82. Id. at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
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The Berenson doctrine has come full circle. It is clear
that the original 1975 decision was generally, even universally,
interpreted as seeking to address the housing needs of people,
including but not limited to lower income people. The often
cited language in that decision, "[r]esidents of Westchester
County, as well as the larger New York City metropolitan re-
gion, may be searching for multiple-family housing in the area
to be near their employment or for a variety of other social or
economic reasons," 83 was interpreted by the appellate division
in the same case as applying to "what we shall simply call the
less affluent residents of the New York City metropolitan
area." 84 The appellate division went to great lengths to distin-
guish between lower income housing needs and the demand
for multi-family housing in general.8 5 It commented sharply
on the anomaly of a developer's proposal to build luxury
housing being grounded upon the needs of lower income
households.8 6 Applying Berenson to the question of standing,
Justice Lazer in Suffolk Housing Services noted that "exclu-
sionary zoning has been defined as land use control regula-
tions which singly [sic] or in concert tend to exclude persons
of low or moderate income from the zoning municipality. '87
Leading commentators echoed this perspective, stressing the
intellectual roots of Berenson in the New Jersey Mount Lau-
rel I decision. 88
Although the fundamental grounding of the Berenson de-
83. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975).
84. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 679
(1979).
85. Id. at 519-22, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 677-79. See also Nolon, Exclusionary Zoning:
New York, New Jersey Cases Compared, N.Y.L.J. July 22, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
86. See Berenson, 67 A.D. 2d at 519, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 677. See also Suffolk Hous.
Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 91 Misc. 2d 80, 90, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977), noting "there is not always an identity of interest between landowners and
those excluded by zoning restrictions particularly where the complaint is not that
multi-family housing is prohibited in Brookhaven, but only that it is so restricted as
to exclude the poor and racial minorities" (citations omitted).
87. Suffolk Hous. Servs., 91 Misc. 2d at 83, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (citing 2 Ander-
son, American Law of Zoning § 8.02 (2d ed. 1976)).
88. See, e.g., Anderson, Survey of New York Law - Land Use Control, 28 Syra-
cuse L. Rev. 109, 110 (1977).
[Vol. 4
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/3
SUBURBAN EXCLUSION
cision in the needs of people, as argued by plaintiffs in Suffolk
Housing Services,89 was eroded in subsequent decisions, it was
left to the appellate division in Suffolk Housing Services to
expunge it entirely. Under the new standard, the only point at
issue is the presence or absence of different housing types, to
the exclusion "of the type of social and economic implications
which the plaintiffs now urge upon us." 90 Instead, the provi-
sion of different housing types is to be limited to an amount
sufficient "for those people who want and can afford
[them]. '
It appears that the appellate division has come to believe
in a Platonic ideal of land use planning in which the physical
uses of the land have been severed from their social and eco-
nomic implications and in which two different housing types
- single-family and multi-family - exist as generic ideal
types independent of any relationship to people or housing
needs. This position, however, as reflected in Suffolk Housing
Services, exists in a legalistic vacuum ignorant of or uninter-
ested in social and economic reality, as well as the reality of
land use regulation. To ignore realities which are as funda-
mental as the nature of housing needs and the economics of
housing is likely to result in bad law. Part III of this article
explores the nature of those realities.
III. Multi-family Housing and The Marketplace: Land Use
Regulations in Economic Context
A. The Changing Character of Multifamily Housing and
the Changing Patterns of Exclusionary Zoning
It is almost a truism that zoning regulation is essentially
socioeconomic in nature. Nowhere is that more apparent than
in the history of zoning practice with respect to multi-family
housing development. The use of the zoning power to exclude
multi-family housing from neighborhoods characterized by
89. See Memorandum, supra note 60, at 58.
90. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 331, 491,
N.Y.S.2d 396, 402 (1985).
91. See id. "
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single family home ownership, and from entire communities,
was historically justified in terms that are clearly more closely
related to the social character of such housing than to its
physical character. The seminal 1926 Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co. decision states:
[T]he development of detached house sections is greatly
retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has
sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for
private house purposes; that in such sections very often
the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in or-
der to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the
district.92
It is arguable that the courts in 1926 had a particular visual
image of multi-family housing in mind, one of buildings that
could be "interfering by their height and bulk with the free
circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which
otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes."93 Whatever the
1926 court may have had in mind, the image of massive tene-
ment buildings covering every inch of their entire sites with
brick and mortar is utterly irrelevant to contemporary subur-
ban multi-family housing. It has been largely irrelevant for at
least forty years. From a physical standpoint, multi-family
housing of the sort constructed in suburban America since the
end of World War II varies remarkably little from single-fam-
ily development in terms of those considerations supposedly
at the heart of zoning regulation: building height, land cover-
age, setbacks, and the like. As a result, it has become almost
commonplace among planning scholars and authorities to ad-
vocate mixing single and multi-family housing types within
single developments."'
92. 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
93. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
94. For discussion in the professional literature of planning developments con-
taining mixed housing types see K. Lynch & G. Hack, Site Planning, 282-83 (1984)
and R. Untermann & R. Small, Site Planning for Cluster Housing, 37-64, 110-13
(1977). A land use regulatory scheme which effectively eliminated any distinction be-
tween single and multi-family housing for zoning purposes in Fort Collins, Colorado,
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The increasing physical compatibility of single-family and
multi-family housing in postwar suburban development has
served to make more clear the underlying socioeconomic basis
for the restriction, and frequent exclusion, of multi-family
housing. While local officials' justification for exclusion was
often fiscal (itself a doubtful basis for land use regulation)
Richard Babcock has pointed out the extent to which that
justification was itself grounded in social stereotypes:
The resident of suburbia is concerned not with what but
with whom. His overriding motivation is less economic
than it is social. His wife spends more at the hairdresser
in a month than the proposed apartment house will add
to her husband's tax bill in a year. What worries both
spouses is that the apartment development is a symbol of
everything they fled in the city. When they protest that a
change in dwelling type will cause a decline in the value
of their property, their economic conclusion is based upon
a social judgment."
Babcock's intuitive judgment was confirmed in a 1973 New
Jersey study, in which an intensive survey of suburban atti-
tudes toward multi-family housing was combined with the
analysis of actual land use decisions governing such develop-
ment. The report concluded that:
Next to the visual aspect of the community image,
social perceptions and fears are another factor underlying
resistance to multi-family development .... [T]he move-
ment to the suburbs has been in many ways a movement
from urban heterogeneity to suburban homogeneity; al-
most always homogeneous at the neighborhood or subdi-
vision level, and often in newer suburbs relatively homo-
geneous in population across the community as a whole.
The quality of homogeneity is largely perceived to stem
from two elements: the physical similarity of the housing
was awarded the Outstanding Planning Program Award in 1982 by the American
Planning Association. See W. Sanders, J. Getzels, D. Mosena & J. Butler, Affordable
Single Family Housing: A Review of Development Standards 69-85 (1984).
95. R. Babcock, The Zoning Game 31 (1966).
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in the community, and the importance of homeownership
in the suburban life style, which, it is believed, frame an
entire complex of related social attitudes and values col-
oring life in the community.
When apartments are permitted, the desire to insu-
late the community from their effects can be noted in the
frequency with which the towns require developers to
erect visual buffers of various sorts between the apart-
ment development and the rest of the community, or in
the relegation of apartments to the least desirable parts
of town. These common practices are an effort to mini-
mize the presence of multi-family development. At the
same time ... renters are seen by many as an undesirable
class, showing no responsibility to the community or even
to the development in which they live. .. . The perceived
population of many multi-family developments, young
couples and singles, is viewed as being particularly unde-
sirable in view of the particular social habits associated
by many with the young.96
Furthermore, the same study, through extensive interviews
with the residents of typical garden apartment developments,
established that these stereotyped images bore little or no re-
lationship to any verifiable reality."7
During recent decades, however, the character of multi-
family housing, with respect to both physical form and tenure,
has become highly diverse. As this has taken place, suburban
land use regulation has gradually moved from a posture of
single-minded opposition to multi-family housing to one in
which distinctions among multi-family types are recognized
and considered in local decisions. The increasing diversity of
multi-family form has been reflected in the increasing volume
96. N.J. County & Mun. Gov't Study Comm'n, Housing & Suburbs: Fiscal & So-
cial Impact of Multifamily Development, Executive Summary 12-13 (1973). In a simi-
lar vein, in one of the early New Jersey cases on exclusion of multi-family housing,
the defendant municipality argued that "the building would bring an undesirable
class of residents into the borough." 2 N. Williams, American Planning Law: Land
Use and the Police Power 347 (1985) (quoting Pumo v. Fort Lee, 4 N.J. Misc. 663,
134 A. 122 (N.J. Super. Ct. (1926)). The court did not, however, find this argument
compelling.
97. N.J. County & Mun. Gov't Study Comm'n, supra note 96 at 8-9.
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of townhouse development, which type has been characterized
as a "design transition between the single-family detached
house and more typical forms of multi-family dwellings
.... 8 More recently, other intermediate housing types have
become more widely known, including zero lot line houses,
which are technically detached single-family houses, but
closely aligned to multi-family housing with respect to many
of their site planning and density characteristics.19 The exis-
tence of these trends has been recognized with the enactment
of Section 281 of the New York State Town Law, which per-
mits the mixing of various housing types on a site zoned for
single-family use through "cluster" provisions without neces-
sitating any change in the underlying zoning classification.' 00
The dimension of tenure has been, arguably, more signifi-
cant than physical form. Beginning in the 1970's, an increas-
ing portion of multi-family housing constructed in the United
States was constructed for condominium ownership rather
than rental.' 0 ' As the New Jersey study established, a signifi-
cant dimension to the socially grounded opposition to multi-
family housing was that such units were rental units and,
therefore, occupants were not homeowners, which implies a
lower social standing and respectability.0 2
There is no question that condominium ownership has
made multi-family housing more attractive to suburban deci-
98. Urban Land Inst., Residential Development Handbook 120-21 (1978).
99. See, e.g., W. Sanders, supra note 94, at 47-67; R. Untermann & R. Small,
supra note 94, at 55. For example, zero lot line single-family houses are generally
developed at site densities of six to eight units per acre, a density characteristic of
many suburban townhouse or mixed townhouse/apartment developments. See W.
Sanders, supra note 94, at 50, 54.
100. New York Town Law § 281 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1987).
101. A 1975 survey found that eight-five percent of all condominium units then
in the national housing inventory had been constructed since the 1970 census. U.S.
Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., HUD Condominium/Cooperative Study (1975), cited
in, R. Engstrom & M. Putnam, Planning and Design of Townhouses and Condomini-
ums 5 (1980).
102. For a particularly valuable analysis of the relationship between social values
and land use in general, and of the significance of home ownership in that respect in
particular see C. Perin, Everything in its Place: Social Order and Land Use in
America (1977). For an extensive discussion of the social position of condominium or
townhouse ownership see id. at 56-60.
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sionmakers and more likely to win zoning approval than was
the case when multi-family housing was assumed to be for
rental occupancy. Local governments have, in fact, sought on
many occasions to mandate condominium ownership of multi-
family units as a condition of land use approval. While much
of this has taken place through informal pressure,0 3 there are
examples of formal governmental action to that end. A New
Jersey municipality adopted an ordinance requiring that
multi-family developments be condominiums. The ordinance,
however, was invalidated by a New Jersey court on the
grounds that the form of tenure was not within the proper
scope of land use regulation. 104 In a similar vein, the Town of
Brookhaven, New York, has, on occasion, imposed covenants
requiring that all of the units in "cluster" developments ap-
proved under Section 281105 be sold as condominiums rather
than rented. This practice was noted, with apparent, although
tacit, approval, in the appellate division ruling in Suffolk
Housing Services.106
103. This is based on the experience of the author, largely in New Jersey. Al-
though the form of tenure is recognized to be beyond the formal scope of local land
use regulation, it is a frequent subject of planning board interrogation at public hear-
ings of developers seeking approval for multi-family developments.
104. Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super. 219, 273 A.2d
397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971). It is doubtful that the municipality's position in
Bridge Park would have been upheld in any state. There is substantial division be-
tween states with respect to the underlying issue; namely, whether tenure in general,
and condominium conversion in particular, can be regulated under municipal land
use regulatory powers. North Carolina takes the same position as New Jersey. See
Graham Court Assocs. v. Town Council, 53 N.C. App. 543, 281 S.E.2d 418 (1981). But
California courts have explicitly upheld the power of a municipality to regulate con-
dominium conversion under the Subdivision Map Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 66,410-
66,499 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). See Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d
526, 703 P.2d 339, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985). To the extent that there is relevant case
law in New York State, it supports the New Jersey position that regulation of the
form of tenure does not fall within the purview of land use regulation. See North
Fork Motel, Inc. v. Grigonis, 93 A.D.2d 883, 461 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1983) (barring a mu-
nicipality from denying permission to change the form of ownership of a motel to
condominiums, as long as the underlying use as a motel remained unchanged);
FGL&L Property Corp. v. City of Rye, 66 N.Y.2d 111, 485 N.E.2d 986 (1985) (over-
turning provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance requiring a certain form of build-
ing ownership on a particular site).
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d
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That such municipal actions were not more widespread is
easily explained by the fact that, for the most part, economic
factors accomplished similar objectives without the need for
coercive pressure by the municipality. Leaving aside publi-
cally subsidized housing, during the latter part of the 1970's
the volume of rental housing construction declined sharply
while condominium construction increased steadily. Table 1
presents an estimate of the distribution of unsubsidized
multi-family housing construction between 1975 and 1984.
From 1975 to 1980, the share of condominiums in unsub-
sidized multi-family housing production increased steadily
from twenty-four percent to sixty-one percent of the total. 07
396 (1985). Strictly speaking, the appellate division did not formally approve the use
of such covenants. The court rejected "plaintiffs' challenge to the alleged practices of
imposing covenants... in the context of the present challenge to the facial constitu-
tionality of the Brookhaven ordinance under the Berenson standard." Id. at 333, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 403. No reasoning was offered. It is possible, although perhaps difficult,
to conclude from this language that while the court found such covenants to be legal
in the context of a Berenson challenge, and not inconsistent with that doctrine, they
might be potentially challenged on other grounds. This, of course, is entirely specula-
tive. It should be noted further that, although the imposition of these covenants was
the exception rather than the rule, informal interrogation of developers, and the solic-
itation of oral pledges by developers that multi-family units would be sold as condo-
miniums, by Brookhaven officials, was more common.
107. As Table 1 shows, production of rental housing increased dramatically in
1983 and 1984. This was the result of a number of factors. While the dramatic reduc-
tion in mortgage interest rates was a significant element, even more important were
the widespread availability of mortgage financing based on tax-exempt revenue bonds
(issued by state and local government entities), and in particular, the availability of
accelerated depreciation (ACRS) made possible by the Tax Reform Act of 1981,
which made multi-family rental housing an exceptionally attractive tax shelter for
wealthy investors. The threatened repeal, or at a minimum significant modification,
of the 1981 depreciation provisions in 1985 immediately triggered a significant move-
ment away from future rental development by many developers and investors. This
trend has been exacerbated by the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which signifi-
cantly reduced the tax advantages to be obtained from development and ownership of
rental housing. One respected late-1986 real estate forecast predicted a thirty-seven
percent decline in rental housing starts in 1987 compared to 1986, largely as a result
of changes in the tax laws. The Lomas & Nettleton Co., U.S. Housing Markets (Dec.
1986) (statistical data from forty-five metropolitan areas, third quarter, 1986).
35
72 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF NEWLY CONSTRUCTED UNSUBSIDIZED
MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN
CONDOMINIUM AND RENTAL OCCUPANCY - 1975 THROUGH
1984 (000)
YEAR CONDOMINIUM RENTAL/i % CONDOMINIUM
1975 46 145 24%
1976 66 180 27
1977 83 236 26
1978 112 216 34
1979 146 146 50
1980 138 88 61
1981 134 88 60
1982 124 116 52
1983 197 288 41
1984 203 331 38
1/It should be noted that a significant percentage, arguably the majority, of "unsub-
sidized" rental units constructed after 1981 were financed with mortgages derived
from the sale of tax-exempt revenue bonds, an indirect but substantial form of public
subsidy. Since such bond issuing is highly decentralized, there are no readily available
statistics which would make it possible to quantify these units.
SOURCE: Analysis by A. Mallach, based upon U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the U.S. (1986) p. 725, and O'Mara & Sears, Rental Housing (1984) p. 16.
The estimate of unsubsidized rental housing was obtained, for this Table, by sub-
tracting the number of condominiums and subsidized housing units from the total
multifamily housing starts, provided in O'Mara & Sears, supra.
Although statistical evidence is lacking, it is likely that the
condominium share of multi-family construction in most afflu-
ent suburbs was substantially larger. 05 Indeed, a recent news-
paper article, announcing the construction of a new multi-
family rental development in Suffolk County, stated "some-
108. A number of representative examples can be cited. Trial Testimony,
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 81 CV. 0541 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1985) (as
recalled by the author) elicited that all multi-family housing approved for develop-
ment during the past decade was for condominium ownership. See also Plaintiffs'
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 47-51, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 81 CV. 0541 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1985). Similarly, in the Town of
New Castle, all of the multi-family housing approved since Berenson has been for
condominium ownership. Telephone interview with John Nolon, Esq., Tarrytown,
New York, Mar. 1986. A review of the real estate advertisements in the Westchester
edition of the New York Times, Sunday, Apr. 20, 1986, identified display advertise-
ments for twenty-five new condominium developments in Westchester County, New
York, and nearby areas. Not one display adverstisement for a new rental development
was noted in the New York suburbs.
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thing unusual is occuring at Artist Lake . . . [w]hat's unusual
is that this development, called Lake Pointe Village, is for
rent, not for sale."'10 9
Townhouse condominium developments in affluent subur-
ban communities have often become nearly as acceptable in
the local regulatory scheme as single-family subdivisions.
Such townhouse developments are often as, or more, expen-
sive than detached single-family houses in the same area and
are often advertised in ways that make it difficult for the cas-
ual reader to determine whether the units are actually de-
tached or attached. 1" 0
As a result of these largely interrelated phenomena, by
the 1980's the once common pattern of across the board exclu-
sion of multi-family housing in suburban municipalities in
New York State, as elsewhere, had become the exception
rather than the rule. Even municipalities in which there was
no applicable multi-family zone as such (the Town of Hunt-
ington on Long Island, for example), found ways in which to
approve those multi-family developments which were consid-
ered to enhance the community socially and economically."'
109. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1. The development in ques-
tion was located in the Town of Brookhaven.
110. The units are usually characterized as "townhomes," "condominium
homes," or "contemporary cluster homes." Examples of such developments in the
suburban New York City metropolitan area, from recent advertisements in the New
York Times, included The Cotswolds, in North Salem, Westchester County (two bed-
room "townhomes" priced at $280,000 to $365,000), N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1986, § 8
(Real Estate), at 28; The Heights at Carrollwood, in Tarrytown, Westchester County
(priced at $240,000 to $330,000), id.; and Ramapo Cirque in Suffern, Rockland
County ("contemporary cluster homes" priced at $264,9000 to $304,900), Apr. 18,
1986, at A23.
111. The text of the Huntington, New York, zoning ordinance provides, on its
face, for multi-family housing only under narrow and highly specific criteria, as
follows:
(1) within "an Urban Renewal Area which has been designated as such
under the provisions of Article 15 of the General Municipal Law" (and which
applies only to a very small area adjacent to the Huntington railroad station),
§ 198-20(A)(3);
(2) public housing "to be owned, maintained and operated by the Hous-
ing Authority of the Town of Huntington" (approval under which has only
been sought once by the Authority, in 1964), § 198-20(A)(2);
(3) senior citizen housing (§ 198-21). A substantial number of expensive
condominium developments have been approved, however, through use of the
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A body of case law that addressed nothing but the total exclu-
sion of multi-family housing, rather than the selective and
discriminatory manner of its inclusion, had become largely, if
not entirely, irrelevant to the new reality of land use
regulation.
The role of local officials as community "gatekeepers,""'
using discretionary powers to screen out development per-
ceived to be undesirable while permitting development con-
sidered to be desirable, is nothing new. The use of discretion-
ary land use authority to prevent construction of subsidized
housing in suburban municipalities is renowned.113 The
changes in character of multi-family housing have not
changed the underlying exclusionary dynamic of suburban
land use regulation, but have merely shifted the locus of the
barriers erected against undesirable land use categories. As
certain elite categories of multi-family housing enter the
realm of the socially acceptable, the barriers remain in place
against other forms of multi-family housing, particularly
rental housing designed for low and moderate income
families." 4
It is obvious that there is a close relationship between the
differently treated multi-family housing types and the differ-
ent housing needs which they address. Therefore, a brief dis-
cussion of the relationship of housing types to housing needs
is appropriate before discussing the nature of the regulatory
practices involved and the manner in which they prevent the
Sec. 281 cluster provisions of Town Law. See also supra note 100 and accom-
panying text.
Furthermore, in a number of cases where the underlying permitted density under the
existing zoning of the site was considered too low for the proposed condominium use,
on a number of occasions the town, upon developer request, first rezoned the site to a
higher density single-family zone, and then applied Sec. 281 provisions, in order to
permit condominium development at densities up to roughly seven units per acre.
Trial Testimony of David Portman, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 81 CV. 0541
(ILG) (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1985) (as recalled by the author).
112. The gatekeeper characterization is from N.J. County & Mun. Gov't Study
Comm'n, supra note 96, at 14-15.
113. See infra Part IV. B.
114. With the obvious exception of lower income senior citizens who represent in
many cases an acceptable category. See infra Table 10, at 94.
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marketplace from responding to the housing needs of the
region.
B. Housing Types, Housing Tenure and Housing Needs
Just as multi-family housing is highly diverse with re-
spect to physical form, or its suburban social acceptability, it
is equally diverse with respect to its role in meeting housing
needs. Housing needs vary widely and, if they are to be ad-
dressed, a wide variety of housing types must be provided.
This variety is manifested in many respects: housing type,
size, price, and tenure. This is particularly important with re-
spect to meeting the needs which appear to be addressed in
Berenson, and which were characterized by the appellate divi-
sion, on remand, as the needs of "the less affluent residents of
the New York City metropolitan area.""' 5
An analysis of representative sales transactions in West-
chester County, New York, documents this statement. As
shown in Table 2, while sales prices for condominiums are
typically less than those for detached single-family homes,
there is no section of Westchester County (including those ar-
eas, such as Yonkers or New Rochelle, generally characterized
as more urban than suburban) in which the typical house or
condominium is affordable to anyone other than the affluent.
Estimating the current median household income in West-
chester County to be approximately thirty-two thousand dol-
lars,' 6 the purchase of the median priced condominium would
115. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d, 669, 679
(1979).
116. Median household income in Westchester County for 1979 as reported by
the 1980 census of population was $22,725. 34 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 1980 Census of Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics
34-983 (1983). Nationally, between 1979 and 1984 (the last year for which data is
available) median household income in dollars increased by 36.2%. See U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986
(106th ed.). Assuming a further 4% increase between 1984 and 1985, the result is:
$22,725 x 1.362 = $30,951 x 1.04 = $32,189.
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TABLE 2: MEDIAN SELLING PRICES FOR SINGLE FAMILY HOUSES AND
CONDOMINIUMS IN WESTCHESTER COUNTY BY ZONE -
MULTIPLE LISTING SALES FOR FOURTH QUARTER 1985
SINGLE FAMILY HOMES CONDOMINIUMS
NUMBER MEDIAN NUMBER MEDIAN
ZONE 1 180 $145,000 17 $ 92,000
ZONE 2 165 200,000+ 23 144,000
ZONE 3 77 196,000 27 175,000
ZONE 4 84 189,000 17 135,000
ZONE 5 71 200,000+ 16 147,000
ZONE 6 85 200,000+ 3 NA
ZONE 7 34 181,000 14 130,000
ZONE 8 72 200,000+ 0 NA
COUNTYWIDE 768 200,000+ 116 138,000
ZONE 1: Peekskill, Cortlandt, Yorktown
ZONE 2: Somers, Lewisboro, North Salem, Bedford, New Castle, North Castle
ZONE 3: Ossining, Tarrytown, Ardsley, Hastings, Mount Pleasant
ZONE 4: White Plains, Greenburgh
ZONE 5: Harrison, Rye, Mamaroneck
ZONE 6: Scarsdale
ZONE 7: Yonkers, Mount Vernon
ZONE 8: New Rochelle, Pelham
NOTE: Some municipalities are divided between zones.
SOURCE: Westchester Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 1985 MLS Sales: October,
November, December (1986). Analysis by A. Mallach.
require an income of nearly double the county median
income.117
117. Using representative figures, an estimate of the annual cost to purchase a
$138,000 condominium is:
Mortgage (10% interest rate for 30 years, assuming a 20%
down payment) 11,625
Property taxes 2.5% of market value 3,450
Condominium fees $75/mo. 900
TOTAL 15,975
Assuming that the figure does not exceed 28% of gross household income, the general
lender standard, the minimum income needed to afford this unit will be approxi-
mately $57,000, or slightly less than double the Westchester County median house-
hold income. It should be noted that new condominium developments being offered
in Westchester in 1986 are substantially more expensive than existing units offered
for resale. The latter category includes a large number of units in older buildings that
have been converted from rental use during the past decade.
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The lower selling price of condominiums, furthermore,
does not mean that they are more affordable than single-fam-
ily homes. It is a reflection of generally smaller size and fewer
bedrooms. A comparative analysis of condominium sales and
sales of single-family houses within the same price range for
that part of Westchester County showing the largest volume
of condominium transactions showed that condominium units
were approximately ten to twelve percent more expensive
than single-family homes in the same area when measured in
terms of selling price per square foot of floor area.
TABLE 3: COMPARATIVE PER SQUARE FOOT (SF) PRICES OF CONDO-
MINIUM AND MODERATELY PRICED SINGLE FAMILY HOUSES
- WESTCHESTER COUNTY ZONE 3
AVERAGE SQUARE AVERAGE SALES PRICE
FEET PER UNIT PER SQUARE FOOT
MODERATELY PRICED
HOUSES 1605 SF $105.27/SF
CONDOMINIUMS 1387 SF $117.90/SF
NOTE: For purposes of reasonable comparison only single family houses selling for
$210,000 (the highest selling price of a condominium unit) or less were included in
the sample.
SOURCE: Westchester Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 1985 MLS Sales: October,
November, December (1986). Analysis by A. Mallach.
It is doubtful that, by affording developers the opportu-
nity to construct condominiums, a municipality in a highly
competitive market area such as Westchester County or Suf-
folk County is creating any meaningful housing opportunities
for the less affluent residents of the region. Such develop-
ments are often approved at densities not significantly higher
than those characteristic of single-family detached home de-
velopments and are expected to sell at prices which are higher
than most single-family homes in the area."'8 The affluent
118. One example is the development under construction on the site which was
the subject of the Berenson litigation, which was rezoned to a density of three units
per acre. Zoning at the same density was provided for a recently-announced condo-
minium development in Mount Kisco (Town of Bedford), New York to sell for prices
ranging from $185,000 to $236,000, or roughly $150 per square foot. N.Y. Times, May
4, 1986, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1.
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buyers of townhouses and condominiums are not drastically
different from those buying single-family detached homes.
They may be distinguished by their preference or their life
cycle stage, but not by their economic resources. "'
The role of rental housing, however, is very different. As a
result of the American drive for home ownership, a drive that
increased markedly during the 1970's,12o the pool of potential
renter households today differs significantly from prospective
owners, with respect to both demographic and economic crite-
ria. First, renters earn substantially less than owners. Median
income for renter households in the United States is only
fifty-eight percent of homeowner households." 1 Furthermore,
the gap has been steadily increasing, particularly in northeast-
ern metropolitan areas, as more affluent households become
homeowners (often of townhouses or condominiums) with less
regard to household size and demographic characteristics than
has traditionally been the case. This is both a suburban and
urban phenomenon and is illustrated by the trend in three
major northeastern areas shown in Table 4. The dynamics un-
derlying the trend have been well summarized by two leading
investigators of the housing market:
Thus, increasingly, rental tenurial arrangements have be-
come focused on nonmodular households, with the most
prominent phenomenon being the movement of "male
head, wife present" households from rental housing into
ownership tenure. Thus, the rental market over the past
decade has been "cream skimmed" - the most affluent
household types have been drawn into homeownership. 22
As a result, rental housing in suburban communities, even
when well out of the reach of lower income households is con-
119. See generally C. Perin, supra note 102, at 56-60; R. Untermann & R. Small,
supra note 94, at 56-59.
120. G. Sternlieb & J. Hughes, The Future of Rental Housing 20 (1981).
121. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1986, Table 743 at 446 (106th ed.).
122. G. Sternlieb & J. Hughes, supra note 120, at 22. For an extensive discussion
of the demographic differences between owners and renters see also A. Downs, Rental
Housing in the 1980's 21-25 (1983).
[Vol. 4
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/3
19861 SUBURBAN EXCLUSION
sistently less expensive than housing for sale in the same com-
TABLE 4: COMPARATIVE INCOME TRENDS FOR OWNERS AND RENTERS
IN THREE NORTHEASTERN STANDARD METROPOLITAN STA-
TISTICAL AREAS (SMSAs) DURING THE 1970'S
URBAN SUBURBAN
OWNER RENTER RENTER % OWNER RENTER RENTER %
OF OWNER OF OWNER
NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK SMSA
1970 $11700 $7200 62% $14000 $ 8800 63%
1976 16500 8900 54 21700 11600 53
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND SMSA
1970 $ 9500 $5900 62% $12300 $ 8700 71%
1976 13400 7600 57 20200 12200 60
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY SMSA
1970 $ 9800 $5900 60% $13700 $ 8500 62%
1977 13000 6300 48 22200 11400 51
SOURCE: U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, and U.S. Dep't of Hous-
ing & Urban Dev., Annual Housing Survey: 1976, New York, N.Y. SMSA; Annual
Housing Survey: 1976 Baltimore, Md. SMSA; Annual Housing Survey: 1977, Newark,
N.J. SMSA.
munity. The Town of Huntington, an affluent Suffolk County
suburban community, is a good example, as shown in Table 5.
It is worth nothing, furthermore, that, although Huntington is
the most affluent town in Suffolk County,'23 rents in that mu-
nicipality are not significantly higher than those representa-
tive of the county as a whole. A countywide survey of repre-
sentative rents taken at the same time found that the average
rent was $544 per month for a one bedroom unit and $646 per
month for a two bedroom unit. 124
Market pressures, which reflect the limited incomes of
123. Median household income in 1979 for the Town of Huntington was $28,155,
or roughly twenty-six percent higher than the Suffolk County median of $22,359. 34
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population and Hous-
ing: Advance Estimates of Social, Economic, and Housing Characteristics 34-65
(1983).
124. Written testimony of Janet Hanson, Executive Director, Suffolk Housing
Services, to United States House of Representatives Budget Committe 2 (Feb. 9,
1985).
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the renter population, have kept the price of rental housing
below that of housing for sale, making it more affordable to a
TABLE 5: UNITS OFFERED FOR RENT IN TOWN OF HUNTING-
TON: MONTHLY RENT ASKED AND AFFORDABILITY BY
UNIT SIZE (DECEMBER 1984)
STUDIO 1 BEDROOM 2 BEDROOM 3+ BEDROOM
0 -$299 1
$300 - $399 5 1
$400 - $499 5 10 1
$500 - $599 2 19 2
$600 -$699 8 9 1
$700 -$799 3 8 3
$800 -$899 1 5 5
$900 - $999 3 5
$1000+ 1 17
Median $400 $550 $725 $1100
Minimum income
required/1 $19,200 $26,400 $34,800 $52,800
1/minimum income required for affordability is based on 25% of gross income for
rent. Under Department of Housing & Urban Development standards, a household is
expected to spend 30% of gross income for rent, including utilities (roughly
equivalent to 25% of gross income for rent without utilities). Since many of the units
offered do not include utilities in the rent, the lower standard has been used to define
affordability in the table.
SOURCE: Newsday, Dec. 1, 1984, Real Estate Supplement. Analysis by A. Mallach.
less affluent segment of the population. The median price of
units offered for sale at the same time in Huntington was
$165,400."' 5 Assuming a conservative ratio of two to one be-
tween price and income, such a unit would only be affordable
to a household earning $83,000 or more, which is substantially
more than the affordability level for physically comparable
rental units.
However, even if the cost of owner-occupied housing were
brought down to the level of rental housing, there would re-
main a substantial pool of households for whom renting repre-
125. See Newsday, Dec. 1, 1984, Part III (Real Estate)(tabulation by the author).
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sents the only viable shelter alternative. The lower a house-
hold's income, the more significant the obstacles in the path
of their obtaining mortgage financing are likely to be."2 6 This
is particularly true among the growing numbers of divorced
and separated parents with children, a major component of
the suburban rental housing need. Many families, even among
those who would be economically capable of becoming home-
owners should the cost of such housing be reduced, are more
appropriately candidates for rental housing by virtue of their
age, their transitional place in their life cycle, or other non-
economic factors.
The market pressures that have kept rents at more af-
fordable levels than housing for sale in the same community,
however, have not made the rental housing that is available in
a community, such as Huntington, available to the lower in-
come population, as that is generally defined. 12 7 The extent to
which the available rental housing is out of the reach of the
lower income population, furthermore, increases dramatically
with unit size. Table 6, below, indicates that while a substan-
tial number of the available studio or efficiency units and a
126. Although the author is unaware of any systematic study, from his experi-
ence there are at least four separate factors which can act as impediments to ob-
taining a mortgage, all of which are significantly more likely to affect lower income
than more affluent households. These factors are:
(a) inability to raise the cash needed for the minimum down payment
and for closing costs;
(b) a work history inadequate to serve as the basis for the mortgage;
(c) a credit history inadequate to serve as the basis for the mortgage,
and;
(d) disproportionate amounts of pre-existing non-housing debt, which re-
duce the size of the mortgage that a lender is willing to offer the prospective
buyer.
127. The definition used here is that of the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev., which defines lower income households as those earning no more than eighty
percent of the median income for the region, adjusted by household size. The term
"very low income" household is used to refer to a household earning between zero
percent and fifty percent of the area median income. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1982).
Note that in the Mount Laurel II decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court utilized
the same definition, but modified the terminology, referring to those households earn-
ing between zero percent and fifty percent of area median as "low income", and those
between fifty percent and eighty percent of area median as "moderate income."
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 221
n.8, 456 A.2d 390, 421 n.8 (1983)(Mount Laurel II).
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smaller part of the one bedroom units are within the reach of
at least the upper ranges of that population, effectively no
rental units with two or more bedrooms are affordable to a
household at even the lower income ceiling in the Town of
Huntington.
TABLE 6: AFFORDABILITY OF UNITS AVAILABLE FOR RENT IN TOWN
OF HUNTINGTON TO LOWER INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
UNIT LOWER INCOME INCOME % UNITS INCOME
TYPE CEILING/1 REQUIRED AFFORDABLE REQUIRED
FOR MEDIAN TO LOWER AS % OF
UNIT INCOME HH/2 LOWER INCOME
CEILING
EFF $18,900 $19,200 43% 102%
1 BR 21,600 26,400 19% 122%
2 BR 25,650 34,800 3% 136%
3 BR 28,700 52,800 0 184%
1/Lower income ceiling adjusted for family size relative to unit size as fol-
lows: efficiency = 1 person; 1 bedroom = 2 person; 2 bedroom = 3.5 person (aver-
age of 3 and 4 person income ceiling), and 3 bedroom = 5 person household.
2/It should be noted that these are the percentages of units affordable to households
earning the ceiling for the respective income/household size category, not units af-
fordable to all lower income households, or even a reasonable cross-section of such
households.
SOURCE: Statistical analysis by A. Mallach based upon data presented in Table 5,
combined with income ceilings provided to author by Suffolk Housing Services.
This disparity is reflective of the general scarcity of mod-
est multiple bedroom rental units. In Huntington, as in many
suburban communities, nearly all three bedroom or larger
rentals are detached single-family homes being offered for
rent by the owners. This is partly attributable to the wide-
spread practice of imposing bedroom covenants on multi-fam-
ily approvals; for example, covenants binding the developer to
limit, and in some cases exclude entirely, units containing two
or more bedrooms. ' 8 Testimony in Suffolk Housing Services
128. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 68-69. This Memorandum also points out
that, in many cases where no formal covenant was imposed, municipal records
showed that developers provided the town board with oral assurances of compliance
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elicited that out of some six thousand apartment units con-
structed in the Town of Brookhaven roughly five thousand
(83%) were one bedroom units and nearly all of the remain-
der were two bedroom units. 2 '
Although the distribution of renters by household size,
which determines the market for rental housing by unit size,
is skewed to smaller households than the distribution of own-
ers, as shown in Table 7, it is not remotely consistent with the
unit size distribution enforced by the practices of the Town of
Brookhaven. Indeed, the bedroom distribution that would be
TABLE 7: RENTERS AND OWNERS BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN NASSAU-
SUFFOLK SMSA, 1980
RENTERS OWNERS
NUMBER % NUMBER
1 PERSON 54338 32.6% 58229 9.1%
2 PERSON 54613 32.7 168297 26.2
3-4 PERSON 43049 25.8 274491 42.7
5-6 PERSON 11875 7.1 119780 18.7
7+ PERSON 3031 1.8 21417 3.3
TOTAL 166906 642214
MEDIAN 2.03 3.25
SOURCE: 34 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Hous-
ing, Table 19, at 34-117.
dictated by the marketplace, at least in theory, from the
above distribution of households by size would be approxi-
mately 50-55% one bedroom units, 30-35% two bedroom
units and 10-20% three bedroom or larger units. In comparing
that distribution with the data in Table 7, it should be noted
that a substantial part of the two-member households in the
rental housing stock are single parents with children, for
whom a two bedroom unit is appropriate, rather than hus-
with the Town's policy of limiting the number of large units in multi-family develop-
ments. Id. at 69. The appellate division rejected plaintiff's challenge of the legality of
these covenants. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 69. Only twenty-three out of the six thou-
sand multi-family units were three bedroom units. This represents all multi-family
rezonings in the town up to the time of trial.
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band-wife couples. 130
This is, however, only a theoretical distribution. It as-
sumes that all of the household sizes and types reflected in
Table 7 are equally able to afford housing in the marketplace.
In actuality, many of the larger renter families, particularly
those headed by a single woman, lack the income to be consid-
ered effective demand by the marketplace. 131 Demand for two
bedroom rental units remains strong, however. A recent study
found that the distribution of market rate apartments com-
pleted in 1982 was 46 % one bedroom units, 46 % two bedroom
units, 5% three bedroom units and 3% efficiency units. 32
These dimensions of the rental housing market suggest
the importance of what can be considered a third sector of the
multi-family universe, that of subsidized rental housing. Con-
dominium developments in the New York suburbs are princi-
pally for the affluent while private market rentals are, if not
only for the affluent, still at least for the non-poor. Subsidized
housing, therefore, often represents the only point of access
by the lower income population to sound and affordable hous-
ing in the overheated suburban housing market.
The evidence that substandard housing conditions are
overwhelmingly a problem of the lower income population,
and in particular the very low income population, has been
repeatedly documented. Nearly 20% of very low income
renter households live in inadequate housing,1 33 compared to
10% of lower income renter households and less than 4% of
130. G. Sternlieb & J. Hughes, supra note 120, at 34. Documents the increasing
percentage of such households in rental housing and the financial implications of this
trend. Id. at 45.
131. In the United States, four person households headed by a husband-wife
couple had a median income of $30,863, while four person households headed by a
single woman had a median income of $9,847, or less then one third as much. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Money Income of Households, Families,
and Persons in the United States: 1983, Table 25 at 88 (1985). Clearly only a small
percentage of households in the latter category are able to complete in the private
market for even the most modest housing.
132. W. O'Mara & C. Sears, Rental Housing 7 (1984).
133. Inadequate housing is defined in the Annual Housing Survey as housing
with plumbing, maintenance, public hall, heating, electrical, or sewage defects or
flaws. It does not include overcrowded housing, a major housing deficiency category.
See Report of the President's Comm'n on Housing, supra note 53, at 7.
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non-poor households.13 4 Furthermore, the incidence of inade-
quate and overcrowded housing,'13 after declining sharply
during the period from World War II through the mid-1970's,
has remained largely the same during the past decade.'13 The
number of renter households with a cost burden, that is,
spending over 30% of gross income for rent, however, has
been rising steadily from 6.2 million households in 1975 to 9.8
million in 1983.1 7 Nearly all such households are lower in-
come households.
Housing available at less than the price or rent com-
manded in the marketplace, whether created through govern-
ment subsidy or through other means, such as inclusionary
housing programs, represents the only method by which the
housing needs of a large part of America's lower income popu-
lation can be addressed in a socially responsible manner.' 8
Similarly, in suburban communities it often represents the
only means through which young families, without the re-
sources to purchase houses at current price levels, can remain
in the communities in which they were raised. The absence of
such housing means that employers may have an increasingly
difficult time finding workers for their lower paying jobs. As
one Long Island, New York, employer complained in a recent
newspaper article:
We have to fight three times as hard to compete for peo-
ple in the labor pool. The higher-level people are a bit
easier to get than the entry-level people. Most of the
134. Analysis by the author, based on data in Report of the President's Comm'n
on Housing, supra note 53.
135. Overcrowding is defined as a unit occupied by 1.01 persons per room. 18
N.J. Reg. 1542(a)(1) (1986).
136. Presentation by Mary K. Nenno, National Association of Housing & Rede-
velopment Officials (NAHRO), prepared for American Planning Association, 1986 Af-
fordable Housing Workshops, San Diego, Calif. (Mar. 13, 1986). Data compiled by
NAHRO from 1975 and 1983 Annual Housing Survey.
137. Id.
138. A detailed discussion of why reliance on the filtering process within the ex-
isting housing stock is an inadequate answer to the housing needs of America's lower
income households is well beyond the scope of this article. The subject is treated
extensively in Mallach, The Fallacy of Laissez-Faire: Land Use Deregulation, Hous-
ing Affordability and the Poor, 30 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 35 (1986).
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higher-level people can afford some kind of housing, even
if it isn't as nice as they are used to. The entry and mid-
dle level people are much more difficult. The rents and
house prices are just too high for most of them.'39
In the same article, the regional planning director for Long
Island noted that "a single person making $20,000 a year can't
afford housing on Long Island - at least not legal housing."" 0
This is hardly a trivial concern. In Suffolk County, in
1980, 37% of all households fell into the lower income cate-
gory, with 20% of all households in the very low income cate-
gory."' It is a concern that is closely linked to zoning and to
local land use regulatory practice generally. The production of
subsidized or below market housing is something that is rou-
tinely thwarted by land use regulation, over and above general
restrictions on multi-family development that may be im-
posed. At the same time, however, although far less often,
there is a growing body of evidence showing that land use reg-
ulation has been used to facilitate, and indeed create, the op-
portunity for affordable housing below market price. It is ap-
propriate to explore the manner in which the socioeconomic
objectives of suburban communities are reflected in their reg-
ulation of multi-family housing in general, and subsidized
housing in particular.
IV. Manipulating the Marketplace: The Effect of the
Discretionary Land Use Regulatory System
on Multi-family Housing
Despite the clear emphasis placed in Berenson on housing
needs, subsequent court decisions have shown no sensitivity
139. O'Hearn, Hiring Hurt by Home Cost, Newsday, Mar. 1, 1986, Part III (Real
Estate) at 29.
140. Id. The article references the practice of creating illegal secondary apart-
ments in single-family homes, a practice widespread on Long Island, which has un-
doubtedly mitigated the effects of the housing crisis in that area. See P. Hare, Acces-
sory Apartments: Using Surplus Space in Single-Family Houses 4 (1981). It should be
noted that an income of $20,000 for a single individual is above the lower income
ceiling for Suffolk County see supra Table 6, at 82.
141. See 34 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Pop-
ulation: General Social and Economic Characteristics 34-983 (1983).
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to, or interest in, the substantial distinctions between these
multi-family housing alternatives and their implications for
meeting housing needs. The decisions have been equally igno-
rant of, or indifferent to, the implications of the process by
which land use decisions are made at the municipal level. Spe-
cifically, the manner in which an informal or discretionary
process, in which social and economic concerns are equal to or
more important than land use issues, has supplanted the for-
mal textbook process of land use regulation with respect to
multi-family housing and, as a result, has led to patterns of
exclusion well beyond those reflected in the letter of the mu-
nicipal zoning ordinance.
Part IV explores the informal land use regulatory process.
The first section addresses the nature of the process and its
effect on multi-family development in general. The second
section focuses specifically on the manner in which the imple-
mentation of the informal land use process has worked to dis-
courage the development of subsidized housing for low and
moderate income families in suburban communities. The
third, and closing, section briefly surveys the extent to which
the courts, in New York and elsewhere, have taken this infor-
mal regulatory system into consideration in dealing with ex-
clusionary zoning issues.
A. Community Gatekeepers and Multi-family Housing
The special, and invidious, status of multi-family housing
in the suburban land use regulatory scheme has frequently
been noted by commentators." 2 Leaving aside the exceptional
cases in which communities have barred multi-family housing
entirely, one consistently finds a two-tier regulatory scheme in
effect. Such schemes permit development of major land uses
such as single-family residential, commercial, or industrial
uses as of right on land already zoned for the purpose, while
apartments are permitted only through some form of special
142. Among the many commentaries that have addressed this issue see New
Jersey County & Mun. Gov't Study Comm'n, supra note 96; R. Babcock, supra note
95; M. Danielson, supra note 1; C. Perin, supra note 102; N. Williams, supra note 13,
at chs. 51 & 62; Davidoff & Davidoff, supra note 1; Sager, supra note 1.
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permit or rezoning procedure in which broad discretion is re-
tained by the municipal officials reviewing the application.
The land use scheme of the Town of Brookhaven is one
example of such two-tier regulation. The analysis of vacant
land by zoning category prepared for the town master plan,
shown in Table 8, documented the availability of substantial
acreage zoned for single-family residential, commercial and in-
dustrial uses. 1 41
TABLE 8: VACANT LAND BY ZONING CATEGORY IN THE TOWN OF
BROOKHAVEN 1973
CATEGORY ACREAGE %
Single family residential (lots >.5 acre) 40,085 58.1%
Single family residential (lots <.5 acre) 19,525 28.3
Industrial 6,435 9.3
Commercial 2,250 3.3
Miscellaneous/1 605 0.9
Multifamily residential 50 <0.1
TOTAL 68,950 100.0%
1/includes special farming categories and retirement communities
SOURCE: Raymond, Parish & Pine, Inc., Vacant Land Analysis (Memorandum to
the Planning Board, Town of Brookhaven) (1974). Actual vacant land analysis as of
September 1973.
In order to obtain rezoning of a parcel for multi-family
use in the Town of Brookhaven, an applicant must pursue a
course which the appellate division aptly characterized as "a
long, cumbersome, expensive, and to say the least, risky pro-
cess."1 "' The applicant must first file a detailed and extensive
application with the planning board, including detailed site
143. With respect to industrial uses, the amount of suitably zoned vacant land
was nearly four times the amount of land already in industrial use in the town. Ray-
mond, Parish & Pine, Inc., Vacant Land Analysis 12 (June 1974) (Draft Memoran-
dum to the Planning Board, Brookhaven Town). The analysis identified only fifty
vacant acres zoned for multi-family development; even this modest amount reflected,
however, sites rezoned as a result of developers' petitions and not yet built at the
time of the survey, rather than mapping of vacant land for multi-family development.
Id. at 6.
144. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 322, 491
N.Y.S.2d 396, 403 (1985).
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/3
SUBURBAN EXCLUSION
and floor plans, traffic studies, environmental studies, and the
like. The planning board reviews the application and holds a
public hearing on the matter. Subsequent to the public hear-
ing, the planning board makes a recommendation to the town
board. The recommendation is of a purely advisory nature,
however, and is often disregarded by the town board. The
same, or an even more extensive application is then filed with
the town board, which undertakes a review de novo; holds a
second public hearing, and eventually renders a decision. The
process can take a year or more from the date of filing the
initial application with the planning board.1"5
While the same procedure is required of any applicant for
rezoning, the likelihood of rezoning for multi-family develop-
ment being granted in Brookhaven has been substantially less
than that for other rezonings, as shown in Table 9. Overall,
during the period studied in Brookhaven, only one out of
eight applications for multi-family rezoning was approved.
Roughly half of all other rezoning applications were approved.
Furthermore, during the 1970's the modest likelihood of ap-
proval for multi-family rezonings dramatically declined from
fifteen percent during the period 1971-1973 to only five per-
cent for the period 1974-1977.14 Many of the few approvals
granted were conditioned upon limitations on the number of
bedrooms per unit, and other similar restrictions.17
TABLE 9: APPROVAL RATE OF APPLICATIONS FOR REZONING BY LAND
USE CATEGORY IN THE TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN 1971-1977
APPLICATIONS APPROVED % APPROVED
Multifamily 94 12 12.8%
Commercial/Industrial 485 245 50.5
Other 133 66 49.6
SOURCE: Analysis by A. Mallach, based upon data gathered from the Town of
Brookhaven Zoning Log by the staff of Suffolk Housing Services.
145. This paragraph is based on the personal experience of the author, who has
prepared and submitted applications for multi-family rezoning in the Town of
Brookhaven.
146. Analysis by the author, based on data gathered from Town of Brookhaven
Zoning Log by staff of Suffolk Housing Services.
147. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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This land use practice in the Town of Brookhaven is not
unique or unusual, but rather, customary.1, 8 While the prac-
tice is indeed customary, at least among suburban municipali-
ties in New York State, it is utterly lacking in any land use
rationale or justification recognized in the professional litera-
ture. Indeed, the site plan review procedures now embodied in
the land use ordinances of the majority of suburban munici-
palities provide more than adequate tools with which to con-
trol the land use and environmental impacts of multi-family
development. The only demonstrable basis for the persistence
of the discretionary process, long after changes in the charac-
ter of multi-family development have eliminated any mean-
ingful land use distinctions, is a socioeconomic one. Regula-
tion of development on socioeconomic grounds is the essence
of the role of the local official as the community's gatekeeper,
opening the municipal door only to those development alter-
natives that conform to the desires and prejudices of the
municipality.
The existence of this practice, and the manner in which it
constrains the satisfaction of housing needs, was documented
by the National Commission on Urban Problems, in 1968:
Some of the most effective devices for exclusion are not
discoverable from a reading of zoning and subdivision or-
dinances. Where rezoning is, in effect, necessary for many
projects... officials have an opportunity to determine the
intentions of each developer with some precision. How
148. This "is the usual and customary way in which municipalities of all kinds
and sizes determine what lands may be developed for multi-family use." Defendant's
Brief After Trial at 31, Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 75-20017
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 1982). It should be noted that considerable nonresidential
development, as well as multi-family residential construction, takes place as a result
of discretionary actions resulting from a petition for rezoning. The dynamics of the
former process, however, are significantly different from the latter. Specifically, where
there is substantial vacant land zoned for a particular use by right, a prospective
developer of that use always has the choice of obtaining approval by right, or seeking
rezoning. As a result, he is unlikely to seek rezoning except under circumstances
where he has reason to believe he will be successful, or, alternatively, where the po-
tential incremental profit relative to building on land zoned by right (which is likely
to be substantially more expensive), if he is successful, justifies a risk, and some spec-
ulative expenditures to that end.
[Vol. 4
54http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/3
SUBURBAN EXCLUSION
many bedrooms will the units in his apartment house
contain? What will be the rent levels? To whom does he
plan to rent or sell? "Unfavorable" answers in terms of
the fiscal and social objectives of such officials do not nec-
essarily mean that permission will be denied outright.
They may, however, mean long delays, attempts to im-
pose requirements . . . over and above those which are
properly required ....
The gatekeeper characterization was first used in the
1973 New Jersey study, which described the process in
straightforward terms:
Use of the variance is at the core of the gatekeeper role.
Were substantial amounts of land zoned for apartments
with appropriate design and environmental criteria writ-
ten into the ordinance, builders could purchase land, sub-
mit plans meeting these criteria, and construct multi-fam-
ily housing without regard to the various unwritten goals
of the community, be they fiscal, visual, or social. Such
goals cannot be written into a local ordinance without im-
mediate, and generally successful challenge in the courts.
By use of the variance process, the community can en-
force many of its preferences through an informal pro-
cess of negotiation between the developer and the plan-
ning board or town council.5 '
No comparable process exists for any other significant land
use category in the suburban land use scheme. The basis for
149. Housing Urban America 289 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer & C. Hartman, eds.
1973) (referring to Nat'l Comm'n on Urban Problems, Building the American City,
pt. III, ch. 1 (1968)).
150. New Jersey County & Mun. Gov't Study Comm'n, supra, note 96, at 15.
The term variance is used in this discussion because of the specific New Jersey con-
text in which it was written. From a substantive standpoint, the term is equivalent to
the rezoning procedure, as it applies in New York State, which does not provide for
change of use through the variance process, except under highly unusual circum-
stances. It should be noted that neither the use variance nor the special exception
variance, as they existed under applicable New Jersey law at the time the study was
written (this procedure was effectively abolished as a result of statutory changes
made in 1976), required the double application, review and hearing procedure re-
quired for a rezoning under the procedures applied in the Town of Brookhaven.
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its existence with respect to multi-family development is so-
cial in character and reflects two fears. One is the fear of who
will occupy the apartments, if built. The second fear is that of
the city, from which in many instances the suburban oppo-
nents of multi-family housing perceive themselves as having
escaped. "'
Thus, at the most basic level, discretionary regulation has
the dual effect of limiting the amount of multi-family devel-
opment constructed, by setting arbitrary hurdles for prospec-
tive multi-family developers, and of channelling development
that takes place into more socially or economically acceptable
forms. It is not surprising, therefore, that these processes have
been widely used as a means of explicitly discouraging the de-
velopment of subsidized lower income housing.
B. Municipal Discretion and Subsidized Housing
The ability of suburban officials to act as the gatekeepers
of their community has been most visibly demonstrated in the
substantial exclusion of subsidized housing for low income
families. In recent years, suburban communities have ac-
cepted substantial numbers of subsidized senior citizen units,
widely perceived as being both largely designed for occupancy
by "our own," while housing proposed for low income families
with children under federal or state subsidy programs has
been consistently opposed, with almost complete success.
151. Danielson notes:
For many suburbanites, apartments mean higher residential densities
which are automatically equated with slums and the kinds of people who live
in slums. "Multifamily dwellings are not considered as housing for people" by
suburban foes of apartments in the St. Louis area, "but as some kind of
blight." "We don't want this kind of trash in our neighborhood," shouts an
opponent of luxury apartments in Suffolk County on Long Island, pointing to
newspaper stories of crime and welfare in New York City.
M. Danielson, supra note 1, at 54 (footnotes omitted). These comments are not iso-
lated ones. An awareness that discretionary approval procedures are used as a means
of excluding or limiting multi-family housing, independently of the facial language of
the zoning ordinance, has become commonplace in the literature on zoning and land
use regulation. See also D. Moskowitz, Exclusionary Zoning Litigation 9-11 (1977);
Rubinowitz, A Question of Choice: Access of the Poor and the Black to Suburban
Housing, in The Urbanization of the Suburbs 329 (L. Masotti & J. Hadden, eds.
1973).
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Evidence of suburban opposition to subsidized family
housing, and of the success most municipalities have had in
excluding such housing, is ample and should not be belabored,
but a few brief examples may be in order. One indicator of the
success of suburban opposition to family housing is the distri-
bution of the over seventeen thousand five hundred Section 8
units financed through the New Jersey Housing and Mortgage
Finance Agency (HMFA) in that state between 1975 and 1985,
shown in Table 10. One three hundred and sixty unit project,
built in a relatively impoverished suburban/rural fringe com-
munity 152 in southern New Jersey accounted for over seventy
percent of all suburban Section 8 family units financed by the
HMFA in New Jersey.153 It is clear that whatever the accom-
plishments of the 1975 Mount Laurel I decision, it did not
materially increase opportunities for development of subsi-
dized family housing in suburban New Jersey.
Similarly, in the Town of Brookhaven, at the time of the
Suffolk Housing Services trial, roughly five years after the in-
ception of the Section 8 program, the town had approved
three senior citizen developments containing one thousand
thirty-five units, but not a single development for family occu-
pancy under the Section 8 program. 54 In 1978 the town had
blocked efforts to construct a two hundred forty unit Section
8 development for family occupancy. 55 A number of years
later, that project was resubmitted and approved after it had
been converted to a two hundred twenty unit project, of which
152. The project in question was built in the Borough of Pine Hill, a community
in lower Camden County. In 1980, the median household income in Pine Hill was
$15,647, roughly 13'( below the county median of $18,056, an average which was it-
self roughly 10% below the New Jersey statewide median income of $19,800. 5 N. J.
1980 Census of Population & Housing Municipal Profiles Part A at 1, 138 & 166.
153. Although some Section 8 housing was developed in New Jersey during the
same period without Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency (HMFA) involvement,
the HMFA units given in Table 10 represent the substantial majority of all Section 8
New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation projects in New Jersey. Furthermore,
the non-HMFA Section 8 developments were, if anything, even more heavily concen-
trated in urban areas than were the HMFA developments.
154. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brook-
haven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985).
155. Id. at 26-30.
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TABLE 10: PROJECTS SUBSIDIZED UNDER FEDERAL SECTION 8 PRO-
GRAM AND FINANCED BY NEW JERSEY HOUSING & MORT-
GAGE FINANCE AGENCY 1975-1985 BY LOCATION AND TYPE
URBAN SUBURBAN TOTAL
NUMBER UNITS NUMBER UNITS NUMBER UNITS
FAMILY 26 4,511 2 512 28 5,023
SENIOR CITIZEN 42 7,062 35 5,451 77 12,513
TOTAL 68 11,573 37 5,963 105 17,536
NOTE: Where a development is shown in the HMFA annual report as being in part
for family and in part for senior citizen occupancy, it has been equally divided be-
tween the two categories, and counted as a project in each category.
SOURCE: Tabulation by A. Mallach from New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Fi-
nance Agency, Annual Report (1985). Classification of communities from New Jersey
Division of State & Regional Planning, New Jersey Municipal Profiles: Intensity of
Urbanization (1972). One municipality (West New York) was reclassified by the au-
thor from Urban-Suburban to Urban Center, based upon an evaluation of the criteria
used in the report.
all but fifty-seven units were for senior citizens. 156 Subsequent
to the Suffolk Housing Services trial, two separate proposals
for rezoning to permit subsidized family housing were
presented by the Suffolk Inter-religious Coalition on Housing
(SICOH) and were turned down by the town board. In one
case, the rejection took place in the face of a favorable recom-
mendation by the planning board.157
The means by which suburban municipalities ensure the
exclusion of subsidized family housing is, of course, through
156. Interview with Janet Hanson, Executive Director, Suffolk Housing Services
(June 1986).
157. The project in question, which was to be constructed in the East Patchogue
neighborhood of the Town of Brookhaven, was denied by the town board on Septem-
ber 15, 1983. A favorable recommendation had been made to the town board by the
planning board regarding this rezoning proposal. Letter from John Luchsinger, Chair-
man, Town of Brookhaven Planning Board to Brookhaven Town Board (July 12,
1983). It should be noted that the recommendation of approval was conditioned on a
variety of matters unrelated to the land use aspects of the proposal, including "the
plan . . . for detailed security on a 24-hour basis and how this is to be implemented
and funded" and "a tenant selection screening committee ... with members from
SICOH, the management firm, the local area, town representatives and others." Id. at
1-2. In denying the rezoning, however, the town board made no reference to any of
these conditions, but merely noted neighborhood opposition. See Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants, supra note 154, at 52.
[Vol. 4
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss1/3
SUBURBAN EXCLUSION
their land use regulatory powers and, more particularly,
through their ability to exercise broad discretion over multi-
family zoning through the processes summarized above. It has
been noted that "[wjith the advent of the Section 235 and 236
programs in 1986, which required neither the participation of
local housing authorities nor the existence of workable pro-
grams, land-use controls became the key suburban weapon to
check the construction of subsidized housing."'158 Black Jack,
Missouri, provides a particularly dramatic example of land
use controls employed as a weapon:
Black Jack had been an unincorporated area governed by
St. Louis County, [which] had adopted a master plan
which designated the site involved in this litigation for
multi-family construction. An option was obtained on the
site by the Inter-Religious Center for Urban Affairs
(ICUA) which intended to build a Section 236 multi-fam-
ily project for moderate-income persons. After the pro-
posed development became a matter of public knowledge,
the residents organized in order to obtain the incorpora-
tion of Black Jack as a city. They were successful in their
efforts and the new city council adopted a zoning ordi-
nance which prohibited the construction of multi-family
housing in the site which ICUA wanted to develop.159
The unusually explicit exclusionary actions in Black Jack,
coupled with the patently racially discriminatory effect, led to
extended litigation through which the plaintiffs obtained sub-
stantial relief, although the development plan was aborted
due to the loss of federal funding initially committed to that
project. 160 It is rare, however, that a municipal action is so ex-
158. M. Danielson, supra note 1, at 96.
159. D. Moskowitz, supra note 151, at 111-12. See also M. Danielson, supra note
1, at 31-33.
160. The Black Jack litigation has an interesting and unusual history, and is
notable for the number of separate times plaintiffs lost at the trial level and suc-
ceeded in having the decisions of the trial courts reversed by the circuit court. Park
View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 454 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev'd,
605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979) (a claim for damages by plaintiffs was settled in 1976
for $450,000 by the City); United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.
Mo. 1974), rev'd, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975),
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plicitly and visibly directed at thwarting the development of
subsidized housing. Moreover, in the absence of evidence of a
racially discriminatory intent, it is often difficult to satisfy a
court that the requisite level of racially discriminatory effect
is present.'1
Most frequently one finds a double standard of land use
regulation. "[I]t is not zoning so much . . . as it is the
[inconsistent or inaccurate or arbitrary administration
thereof. ...We find that many, many times a rezoning ap-
plication will be treated different[ly] if it is for a luxury apart-
ment than if it is for a 236 project."" 2 The process of selecting
socially acceptable forms of multi-family housing affects sub-
sidized housing most directly, and excludes it most thor-
oughly, even where substantial numbers of non-subsidized
multi-family units are able to pass through the suburban net.
Issues are raised in response to rezoning applications for
subsidized housing, or challenges to exclusionary zoning,
which are rarely heard in other settings. Environmental issues
are widely used as the pretext for opposition to lower income
housing.163 In Brookhaven, planning board objections raised in
reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 335
F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972). Although plaintiffs
did not develop any housing in Black Jack, a Section 8 project for low income fami-
lies was constructed by a private developer in the City in 1982.
161. The difficulties typically lie in two areas. With respect to discriminatory
effect, the statistical issues associated with the question of the disproportionate effect
of municipal action or inaction on racial minority groups, as articulated in Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977),
pose particular problems. Faced with a more complex statistical picture than that
evident in Arlington Heights, courts are often reluctant to draw even those conclu-
sions that may be apparent to parties in the case. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 109 A.2d 323, 334, 337, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396, 404, 406 (1985). The second
issue is the difficulty of establishing that local officials' actions were racially moti-
vated. Although plaintiffs may be able to show that neighborhood opposition was ra-
cially motivated, and that local officials' actions may have been grounded at least in
part in their awareness of neighborhood opposition, courts have been equally reluc-
tant to draw the connection between the two. Id. at 337-38, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
162. M. Danielson, supra note 1, at 97 (quoting a Dayton planner) (footnote
omitted).
163. See M. Brooks, Housing Equity and Environmental Protection: The Need-
less Conflict 9-12 (1976). In one major exclusionary zoning case, the New Jersey chap-
ter of the Sierra Club filed an amicus brief in support of the municipality. See id. at
10. On another occasion, objectors to a subsidized housing project filed a lawsuit
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response to subsidized housing proposals have focused on
matters unrelated to land use, such as details of the project
management plan, 24-hour security, and the proper supervi-
sion of children from single parent families.' 6 '
In the final analysis, the reasons for disapproval of subsi-
dized housing are likely to have little relationship to the pre-
texts brought forward.
Requests for rezoning or special exceptions also alert local
residents to the developer's plans before approval has
been secured. In the wake of disclosure that subsidized
housing is planned for a site, opponents usually turn out
in force, dominating hearings and other public proceed-
ings of local planning, zoning, and governing bodies. In
the emotional climate that often results, rezoning for sub-
sidized housing usually is rejected by suburban officials
responsive to the interests of their local constituents.16 5
In Brookhaven, it is customary practice, in public hearings re-
garding multi-family rezonings, for the presiding officer to
seek a show of hands from the audience with respect to their
support for or opposition to the proposal. ' The denial of the
SICOH rezoning applications was perceived, indeed, as an al-
under the National Environmental Policy Act claiming that the presence of poor peo-
ple in and of themselves would adversely effect the environment. Nucleus of Chicago
Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973). It should be noted that
the court did not find it difficult to dismiss this claim.
164. Letter from Dorothy Horak, Secretary, Town of Brookhaven Planning
Board, to John J. Hart, Jr., Esq., attorney for SICOH (Jan. 26, 1983). "At the hear-
ing, the applicant indicated that single parent households would utilize this site. In-
formation would be required as to supervision and care of children from said single
parent households." Id. at 2. In the end, the planning board rejected the rezoning
application for the site on which this question was raised (a site in the East Setauket
area of the Town), on the grounds that "the answers it had received were insuffi-
cient." Village Herald, June 1, 1983, at 3. In an interesting recent West Virginia case,
that state's Supreme Court overturned a denial of approval for a public housing de-
velopment, stressing that the denial had been grounded in improper considerations,
particularly with respect to the social and economic characteristics of the prospective
occupants. Kaufman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the City of Fairmont, 298
S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1982).
165. M. Danielson, supra note 1, at 97.
166. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 154, at 28.
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most routine matter to a newspaper reporter covering the
story:
It took the local zoning board two minutes recently
to turn down a proposal by a coalition of religious leaders
and civic activists for a 60 unit garden apartment com-
plex for people with low and moderate incomes.
Though the rejection was swift, it was not surprising.
Echoing traditional suburban resistance to subsidized
apartment projects, hundreds of residents had argued
that the project would threaten the quality of life in this
village on Suffolk County's south shore."'7
At that hearing, the Brookhaven Town Supervisor (mayor)
summarized the basis for the town board's action: "May I say
there is a need for this housing desperately in the Town of
Brookhaven. But until it has the support of the community
where it is located, I don't feel that you are going to get a
[town] board that is going to approve it."'"" In a subsequent
letter to a prominent local religious leader, the same official
justified the denial of the projects by writing that "[b]oth ap-
plications of SICOH were adamantly opposed by residents of
the areas involved."'' 9
Citizen opposition, although facially directed at a variety
of concerns, is often grounded in racial fears, prejudices and
stereotypes. 70 In most cases, however, as objectors become
167. Economics May Change Climate of Suburbia, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1983,
§ 4 (The Week in Review) at E6.
168. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Appeal at
27, Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396
(1985) (filed Apr. 25, 1986) (quoting statement of Henrietta Acampora, Supervisor,
Town of Brookhaven, Minutes of Town Board Meeting (Sept. 20, 1983)).
169. Letter from Henrietta Acampora, Supervisor, Town of Brookhaven, to
Rabbi Adam D. Fisher (Oct. 21, 1983).
170. In the Black Jack case, community opposition was fueled by the desire to
prevent "another Pruitt-Igoe in the suburbs." M. Danielson, supra note 1, at 84.
Pruitt-Igoe was the notorious trouble-prone high-rise public housing project in the
city of St. Louis which, in the end, was demolished with considerable publicity in
1976. See Rainwater, The Lessons of Pruitt-Igoe, reprinted in Housing Urban
America 548 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer & C. Hartman, eds. 1973). It is frequently men-
tioned, in the author's experience, by suburban opponents of subsidized housing as
the basis for their position. Needless to say, the proposal for the Black Jack site, as is
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relatively more sophisticated in their approach, racial motiva-
tions are veiled.17 1 In the final analysis, the effects are the
same. Subsidized housing for low income families, widely and
often accurately perceived as being disproportionately occu-
pied by members of minority groups, is barred, and largely
white senior citizen housing is approved.'72
C. The Discretionary Process and the Courts
While defendants in Suffolk Housing Services may have
characterized the two-tier regulatory system in effect in the
Town of Brookhaven as universal,17 3 a characterization ac-
cepted without qualification by the trial court'7 4 New York
State today increasingly stands as an anomaly among the ma-
jor urban states of the nation in its unlimited tolerance of this
patently discriminatory system. The three other states most
widely known for land use regulation - California, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania - have explicitly required, as a re-
sult of legislative action or case law, that municipalities map
sites for multi-family housing in advance of applications from
developers, at least to the extent needed to meet local and
regional housing needs.' 7 5
true for nearly every suburban subsidized housing proposal, was for low density
apartment units rather than high rise housing. This author is unaware of any such
low density suburban subsidized project actually built which, after completion, devel-
oped problems even remotely comparable to those experienced in the Pruitt-Igoe
development.
171. As the leader of the objectors to one of the SICOH projects commented,
denying any racial motivation, "[w]e're a middle-class community here - we're too
smart for that." Rental Plan Stirs Three Villages, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1982, § 21,
(Long Island Weekly) at 16.
172. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 154, at 62. The only subsidized
family housing in the Town of Brookhaven at the time of trial had a minority occu-
pancy rate of approximately thirty-eight percent. Subsidized senior citizen housing in
the town had an average black occupancy of approximately two percent.
173. See supra note 148.
174. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No.75-20017 at 15-16
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
175. Massachusetts, another important land use law state, although not directly
requiring pre-mapping of sites, addressed the same issue through enactment of the
"anti-snob zoning" law in 1969. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West
1969). Under this law, a developer has the right to appeal a municipal denial of per-
mission to build low or moderate income housing to a state appeals board. That body
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The California housing legislation is perhaps the most ex-
plicit. Under the provisions governing the housing element of
the municipal general plan (master plan), every municipal-
ity176 must:
Identify adequate sites which will be made available
through appropriate zoning and development standards
and with public services and facilities needed to facilitate
and encourage the development of a variety of types of
housing for all income levels, including rental housing,
factory-built housing and mobile homes, emergency shel-
ters and transitional housing in order to meet the commu-
nity's housing goals.1
7
The housing goals themselves are based on a determination of
both local and regional housing needs. The latter are, by stat-
ute, determined by the regional council of governments, or for
areas where no such entity exists, by the State Department of
Housing and Community Development. 78
In New Jersey, Mount Laurel II clearly established the
affirmative responsibility of the municipality to provide for
low and moderate income housing needs. In addition, legisla-
tion has been enacted establishing specific standards by which
those responsibilities are to be met.1 79 The central element in
the new legislative scheme is the requirement that all munici-
palities prepare a housing element as a part of their master
may order the permission granted, if the municipality has not already approved cer-
tain minimum amounts of low or moderate income housing, as defined in the statute.
See N. Williams, supra note 13, § 66.30
176. Under California law, counties have the power to regulate land use in unin-
corporated areas, representing a substantial part of the state. Thus the term "munici-
pality" used here should be read to include counties as well.
177. Cal. Gov't Code § 65583(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987)(emphasis omitted). It
should be noted that the general plan and its constituent elements are binding regu-
latory documents under California law, in contrast to the purely advisory character of
the master plan under New York State law.
178. Cal. Gov't Code § 65584(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1987). Note that subsection (b)
provides that, under certain circumstances, the Department of Housing and Commu-
nity Development can delegate its responsibility for determining regional housing
needs to local jurisdictions. This delegation applies only in those areas lacking coun-
cils of governments.
179. N.J. Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986).
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plan, which element must meet a variety of explicit statutory
criteria. Among other provisions, the housing element must
include "[a] consideration of the lands that are most appro-
priate for construction of low and moderate income hous-
ing .. .including a consideration of lands of developers who
have expressed a commitment to provide low and moderate
income housing."' 80 Unlike California, New Jersey does not
bind municipalities strictly to the provisions of their master
plans. '8 The New Jersey law provides, however, that "the
municipality shall establish that its land-use and other rele-
vant ordinances have been revised to incorporate the provi-
sions for low and moderate income housing. '182
A similar doctrine has been in effect in Pennsylvania
since In re Girsh was decided, in 1970.183 This case, dealing
with the denial of approval to a developer seeking to build
multi-family housing in a growing suburban township, appears
to be the first significant decision, and one of the few, in
which the invidious character of the two-tier regulatory sys-
tem is explicitly addressed. The court noted that "[aippellee's
land use restriction in the case before us cannot be upheld
against constitutional attack because of the possibility that an
occasional property owner may carry the heavy burden of
proving sufficient hardship to receive a variance."'' 84 The court
continued, more significantly:
By emphasizing the possibility that a given land owner
could obtain a variance, the Township overlooks the
broader question that is presented by this case. In refus-
ing to allow apartment development as part of its zoning
180. Id. § 52:27D-310(f).
181. New Jersey law requires municipalities to adopt at a minimum the land use
element of a master plan as a condition precedent to adoption of a municipal zoning
ordinance, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-62(a) (West Supp. 1986), and to carry out a de-
tailed reexamination of that master plan every six years. Id. § 40:55D-89. The zoning
ordinance, however, is the controlling document for purposes of development regula-
tion, and zoning regulations inconsistent with the master plan may be adopted by the
municipal governing body by following certain procedures. Id. § 40:55D-62(a).
182. N.J. Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-11 (West 1986).
183. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
184. Id. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397.
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scheme, appellee has in effect decided to zone out the
people who would be able to live in the Township if
apartments were available . . ..
The Girsh doctrine has since been refined by the Pennsylva-
nia courts and broadened to include the fair share principle
explicitly embodied in the California and New Jersey legisla-
tion,186 albeit in a less precisely quantified manner."'
Ironically, the trial court in Berenson showed considera-
ble sensitivity to the issue posed here, noting "it would be un-
realistic to expect multi-family housing to be built in the fu-
ture unless provision is made now to set aside adequate lands
for that purpose."18' The court then explicitly offered the
Town of New Castle two alternative approaches to rezoning:
The Town ... may create a "floating" zone, a conditional
use or other special permit process for such housing that
is not located geographically or mapped until the specific
development proposal is approved in accordance with the
prestated inclusionary policy statement. This will avoid
185. Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397. In marked contrast to the holding of the appel-
late division in Suffolk Housing Services, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took no-
tice of the existence of some apartments in the municipality - two projects approved
by variance - but found that their existence was irrelevant to the more fundamental
issues raised by the case. Id. at 239-42, 263 A.2d at 396-97. See also the discussion of
this case in N. Williams, supra note 13, §§ 50.18, 66.22.
186. See Cal. Gov't Code § 65584(a) (West Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 52:27D-307 (West 1986).
187. The Pennsylvania courts adopted the fair share doctrine, conceptually if not
quantitatively, in finding that the amount of land mapped for multi-family develop-
ment in a given suburban municipality was inadequate in light of the community's
fair share responsibility. Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa.
445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). An effort to provide a body of planning criteria, still with-
out explicit quantification, for the Pennsylvania fair share doctrine was made in Sur-
rick v. Zoning Hearing Board, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1978). The issue was, how-
ever, somewhat muddied in a subsequent decision, In re M.A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa.
200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983), in which a developer's effort to compel a municipality to
permit a townhouse development was unsuccessful on the basis that the township
already permitted certain types of multi-family housing (although not townhouses) in
another part of the township. See also Payne, From the Courts: Doctrine and Politics
in Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 12 Real Est. L.J. 359 (1984).
188. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, Index No. 4239/73 at 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 6, 1977).
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the problem of mapping such districts with such specific-
ity that land prices may escalate to such an extent that
interferes with the economic feasibility of proposed devel-
opment. Refusal of development permission may be jus-
tified only for inconsistency with the Town's inclusion-
ary policy statement. Alternatively, if and to the extent
that the Town should decide to locate the zones for
needed housing geographically in advance, it may "over-
zone" for this purpose to avoid inflated land values or the
possibility that such land may instead be used up for
lower density housing.189
Thus, while recognizing that there can be legitimate reasons
for not pre-mapping multi-family zones, the judge, although
clearly aware of the potential abuse arising from that practice,
made it clear that that alternative would not provide for the
sort of discretion typically exercised by suburban munici-
palities.
Another trial court found against the Town of North Sa-
lem, New York, and ordered rezoning to comply with the Ber-
enson doctrine. In this particular case, the town already per-
mitted multi-family housing in certain, although limited,
zones by special permit. 90 In finding the municipality's zoning
invalid and ordering rezoning, the trial court explicitly re-
quired that the rezoning provide for multi-family housing "in
a zone for such use, as of right."''
The appellate division did not pursue the issues raised by
the trial court in Berenson. While the Town of New Castle
did in fact provide for mapped multi-family zones in its sub-
sequent remedial ordinance, no doctrine governing the under-
lying issue was created as a result of the Berenson decision.
189. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). The reference to overzoning in order to ensure
that adequate land will be available to meet the municipality's fair share obligation,
notwithstanding the loss of some land to lower density development, the unwilling-
ness of some landowners to sell for development, etc. evolved from the New Jersey
Supreme Court decision in Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
190. 208 E. 30th Street Corp. v. Town of North Salem, Index No. 12588/79 at 2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 3, 1980).
191. Id. at 13.
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Moreover, the North Salem decision was neither reported nor
appealed. Thus, the New York courts, while offering lip ser-
vice to the ideal of housing opportunity, have not yet moved
against a practice which effectively nullifies that opportunity
for all but those classes of population most favored by each
suburban municipality's official gatekeepers.
V. Toward Zoning to Meet Regional Housing Needs
The Law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well
as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets,
and to steal bread. - Anatole France192
A. Ending the Pretense of Zoning Neutrality
Zoning, notwithstanding the legal fictions characteristic
of case law, is not economically neutral. It is most patently
discriminatory when administered through the exercise of
largely unbridled discretion. Even when that discretion is
curbed and the full range of land uses are permitted as of
right, however, true neutrality of the ordinance with respect
to housing needs and opportunities does not necessarily
follow.
The standards of a given zone - minimum lot area,
frontage, setback, interior floor area, and the like - can be
translated into a minimum cost for a unit built in that zone,
which in turn will dictate the minimum income a household
will need to live in that zone. 193 At least with respect to single-
family residential zones, the only households having the nec-
192. The Home Book of Quotations 1079 (B. Stevenson ed. 10th ed. 1967)(citing
Cournos, Modern Plutarch 27).
193. See L. Sagalyn & G. Sternlieb, Zoning and Housing Costs: The Impact of
Land-Use Controls on Housing Price (1972). A purely technical analysis of minimum
housing costs related to zoning standards is relatively straightforward, and has been
done often in connection with exclusionary zoning litigation. See Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants, supra note 154, at 21. In actuality, the issue is more complex, since the
actual cost of the unit will be a function of the interaction of the zoning requirements
with the characteristics of market demand in the area. See G. Hack & G. Polk, Hous-
ing Costs and Governmental Regulation: Is Regulatory Reform Justified by What We
Know? 5-8 (1981).
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essary minimum income will typically be the most affluent
ones in the municipality or region."9' When one turns to
multi-family zoning, the economic dimensions of the regula-
tory scheme become more complex.
It is possible to draft language governing a multi-family
district so that "least cost" zoning'95 is created. That is to say,
no costs are directly generated by the ordinance over and
above those intrinsic to producing housing meeting minimum
standards of health and safety. Even such an ordinance, how-
ever, under most circumstances, is unlikely to result in the
construction of any appreciable number of lower income hous-
ing units. 96 Multi-family housing includes a wide variety of
housing types, from both an economic and physical stand-
point. In competing for suitably zoned land, the more expen-
sive, and therefore more profitable, housing types will consist-
ently outbid the others. The price of multi-family zoned land
therefore will reflect the most expensive multi-family housing
which market demand will permit. Consequently, only expen-
sive housing will actually be constructed.
The upward pressure on land prices that emerges in any
area demonstrating significant development demand is rela-
tively insensitive to variations in the quality of land, or to an
excess of the supply of suitably zoned land over the market
194. In the largest lot zone in Brookhaven, based on testimony presented at trial
by the author, and depending on variables such as taxing districts (of which there are
many separate districts within the town), percentage of income devoted to shelter,
etc., the minimum income needed to purchase the least expensive house that could be
built would be between $47,000 and $69,000. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra
note 154, at 21. The median household income in Brookhaven in 1979, roughly the
time of the Suffolk Housing Services trial, was $20,864. 34 U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Advance Estimates of Social, Economic, and Housing Charac-
teristics 34-63 (1983).
195. See Oakwood at Madison v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 512-14, 371
A.2d 1192, 1207-08 (1977). It should be noted that there are distinct differences, par-
ticularly with respect to different regions in the United States, as to precisely what
constitutes "least cost" zoning. In particular, a density level that may be considered
the maximum consistent with health and safety for a two-story garden apartment
development in the northeastern United States may be considered unreasonably low
in California, where norms of density are consistently higher. See A. Mallach, Inclu-
sionary Housing Programs: Policies and Practices 111-12 (1984).
196. This is particularly true in the absence of substantial federal subsidy funds.
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demand for the land. While in theory these factors should af-
fect the pressure on land prices, and result in lower land
prices and thus lower housing costs, this often fails to take
place in reality. The land market is an irrational one. Land-
owners develop expectations of the value of their land which
tend to be highly responsive to any upward movement of the
land market and highly unresponsive to downward move-
ments. 
197
The land market is not entirely oblivious to reality. Cir-
cumstances which could be considered optimal for construc-
tion of multi-family housing affordable to lower income house-
holds, within the parameters of conventional land use
regulation, can be imagined, although it is unlikely that they
actually exist in any real world municipality. In an environ-
ment where demand for expensive multi-family development
is weak and the amount of land suitably zoned for least cost
multi-family housing is in excess of demand, it is conceivable
that some of the land (albeit the less desirable parcels), would
be available at prices within the reach of subsidized develop-
ment or development of least cost housing. 198 Assuming that
development standards governing the land were reasonable
and largely free of cost-generating provisions, it might be pos-
sible, with public subsidies, for housing affordable to lower in-
come households to be constructed. For example, given the
limited market demand in the Town of Brookhaven in 1979,
when SICOH was seeking to buy land for the development
proposals, it is very likely that had there been land zoned for
multi-family development, it would have been possible for
SICOH to purchase it at a price consistent with the con-
197. This is a version of the phenomenon known to economists as a "price
ratchet." That is to say, land prices tend to remain fixed at the upward end of a price
cycle for an extended period after changes in objective reality have come to dictate
lower prices. See A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 90.
198. One question which has not been satisfactorily addressed relates to the ex-
tent of overzoning dictated by this hypothesis: what is the excess of land supply rela-
tive to demand that is necessary before some of the land becomes available at prices
substantially below those commanded by the most desirable parcels? Intuitively,
given the strength of the price ratchet, the author believes that the amount of suita-
bility zoned, developable and available land might have to be three or more times
that for which effective market demand exists.
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straints of the federal Section 8 program. 199
One cannot count on private market demand to be ab-
sent. The need for affordable housing tends to be greatest in
those areas which show the strongest levels of market demand
because those areas are likely to be experiencing the greatest
employment growth as well as the greatest price pressure on
the existing housing stock. Thus, land market conditions in
the areas of greatest need are likely to be farthest from the
optimal conditions suggested above. Recognition of these con-
siderations led Justice Trainor, in Berenson, to propose the
creation of a "floating zone" for multi-family housing, or in
the alternative, to pre-map and "over-zone" the land desig-
nated for that purpose. 200
The problem with Justice Trainor's proposed floating
zone, in which the land is not pre-mapped for multi-family
development but in which the municipality, under court or-
der, is given little or no discretion to refuse to rezone a parcel
that meets certain objective criteria, is that it begs the issue.
A municipality that is actively seeking to thwart multi-family
development will be able to use even the barest glimmer of
discretionary authority to that end. Even mandatory dead-
lines for action can be sidestepped without great difficulty.2"'
Barring ongoing and active judicial supervision (which is usu-
199. This is based on the experience of the author, who was in part responsible
for seeking potential development parcels for SICOH in 1979. At that time, with vir-
tually no development activity taking place, and thousands of acres of vacant and
potentially developable land being offered, a wide variety of parcels were available in
the vicinity of $10,000 per acre or less, almost without regard to zoning categories.
200. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, Index No. 4239/73 at 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 6, 1977).
201. A good example of this is in New Jersey, where the Municipal Land Use
Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:55D-1 to -112 (West Supp. 1986), adopted in 1976, estab-
lished explicit time limits for municipal land use actions: e.g., preliminary site plan
approval (§ 40:55D-46(c)); minor subdivision approval (§ 40:55D-47); preliminary ma-
jor subdivision approval (§ 40:55D-48(c)). In the author's experience, however, innu-
merable applicants have been asked to waive their right to a decision within the
deadline, and have done so, facing the implicit or explicit threat that their failure to
waive that right would result in denial of the application. At least one municipality
known to the author, as of 1984, required a written waiver in advance, as an element
in any applicant's submission, of the right to a decision within the statutory dead-
lines. Applications which did not contain the waiver were treated by the municipality
as incomplete and not processed.
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ally and justifiably avoided by the courts), such a remedy is
apt to ultimately be more closely related to the problem than
the solution.
The problem is compounded by the near total absence of
federal or other housing subsidy funds. Even under the fed-
eral Section 8 program, through which federal housing subsi-
dies for new construction were available between 1974 and
1982, as long as costs fell within limits acceptable to the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
Section 8 subsidy funds covered the difference between what a
lower income household could afford and the actual cost of
building and operating the units. Thus, if a Section 8 devel-
oper were seeking to build in a town in which the optimal cir-
cumstances described above existed, he might well be able to
find an affordable site and develop a project meeting HUD
criteria, thus providing housing affordable to lower income
households.
In the absence of public subsidy funds, facial neutrality
of the municipal land use scheme will not guarantee housing
affordable to lower income households. Even under optimal
circumstances, the combination of the profit demands of the
developer and the inexorable realities of the cost of building
housing will invariably place the resulting housing out of the
reach of all or most of the lower income population.0 2 In the
optimal conventional multi-family zoning environment at
least some of the multi-family housing constructed is likely to
be less expensive than that constructed under more represen-
tative suburban systems. 203 It will, nevertheless, still fall
short of meeting the full range of housing needs addressed in
Berenson. Furthermore, even this modest accomplishment is
only likely to occur under circumstances which are unheard of
in New York State suburban zoning.
The conclusion is clear: while remedial action within the
202. An analysis illustrative of the cost level of developing under more or less
optimal conditions, as of 1983, is given in A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 80-83.
203. Given enough overzoning, and generally reasonable land use standards, it is
likely that developers seeking to build to less affluent segments of the market will be
attracted into the market, thus leading to simultaneous construction within a commu-
nity of both more and less expensive housing.
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framework of conventional zoning can undoubtedly bring
about some improvement in the availability and affordability
of housing, that improvement is inevitably severely limited by
the interplay of the economic realities of housing development
with land use regulation. Furthermore, to accomplish that
modest improvement, the remedy would have to provide for
massive overzoning of land for multi-family development be-
yond the measurable market demand for such housing, in or-
der to free up any significant opportunity for development of
other than the most expensive multi-family types. Finally, the
effectiveness of conventional zoning remedies is likely to be
least in those areas of greatest housing demand, in which the
need is greatest. This is not surprising because the false neu-
trality of conventional zoning does no more than reinforce the
directions set by economic pressures and market demands.
If zoning is to be used as a means of creating affordable
housing opportunities, the pretense of neutrality must be
abandoned. A new approach to land use control, in which the
economic realities of land development are consciously and
explicitly addressed and used as the basis for affirmative regu-
lation, must be adopted. This approach, generally known as
inclusionary zoning, has been shown to be an effective means
of producing lower income housing in growing suburban hous-
ing markets. Housing programs grounded in inclusionary zon-
ing ordinances represent perhaps the only way by which,
under today's economic conditions, the promise of Berenson
can become reality for the lower income population of New
York State.
B. Using Inclusionary Zoning to Meet Regional Housing
Needs
1. What is Inclusionary Zoning?
Inclusionary zoning ordinances, and housing programs
based on such ordinances, represent an approach by which the
development of less expensive affordable housing is integrated
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into the development of housing responsive to market demand
in a community.0 4
The essence of inclusionary zoning lies in the economic
linkage that is created between the lower income units and
the market units in the same development. To that end, such
programs can be either mandatory ones, where inclusion of
lower income units is required as a condition of development,
or voluntary, in which the developer is offered an incentive,
typically an increase in the permitted density, to provide
lower income units. Many mandatory programs, rather than
simply superimposing the inclusionary requirement on preex-
isting zoning, couple it with a simultaneous and substantial
increase in permitted density. Thus, an implicit density bonus
is often part of a mandatory program as well.
A typical inclusionary zoning ordinance, in addition to
the usual land use controls governing development (density,
coverage, setbacks, etc.) will specify the percentage of lower
income units to be provided and define the income range or
ranges of the population to whom those units are to be afford-
able. The inclusionary ordinance adopted in Orange County,
California, in 1978, for example, required that twenty-five per-
cent of the units in each development be "affordable hous-
ing." The distribution of these units by affordability level was
to vary, as shown in Table 11, depending on the availability of
public subsidies. °5
204.
An inclusionary zoning ordinance is a zoning scheme under which pro-
spective developers are required by a municipality or county to provide, as a
condition of approval, or, alternatively, are given incentives to provide low-
and moderate-income housing as a part of, or in conjunction with, their pro-
posed development projects.
An inclusionary housing program is a program designed to bring about
housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households in a community,
using a variety of programs and activities, but relying principally for its im-
plementation on an inclusionary zoning ordinance... under an inclusionary
housing program, the provision of housing for lower income households be-
comes part and parcel of the overall residential development of the commu-
nity, constructed as a direct outcome of the construction of more expensive
housing, and in some cases ... as an outcome of nonresidential development.
A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 2.
205. A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 12.
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TABLE 11: AFFORDABILITY REQUIREMENTS IN ORANGE COUNTY, CALI-
FORNIA INCLUSIONARY PROGRAM (% OF TOTAL UNITS IN
DEVELOPMENT)
Units to be afford- If public sub- Subsidies not
able to households sidies available available
earning:
Below 80% of median 10% 0
80%-100% of median 10% 15%
100%-120% of median 5% 10%
SOURCE: S. Schwartz, R. Johnston & D. Burtraw, Local Government Initiatives for
Affordable Housing: An Evaluation of Inclusionary Programs in California 24
(1981).
In New Jersey, ordinances typically require between fif-
teen percent and twenty-two percent of the units in inclusion-
ary developments to be affordable to lower income house-
holds. In keeping with the guidelines set forth by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the Mount Laurel II decision, half
of these units are generally targeted to low income households
and half to moderate income households.20
in addition to establishing the requirements for lower in-
come units in the development, a comprehensive inclusionary
zoning ordinance, or subsequent regulations based on the or-
206. Low income households are those earning between zero and fifty percent of
the regional median income, adjusted for family size. Moderate income households
are those earning between fifty percent and eighty percent of the regional median,
adjusted for family size. The definitions of applicable income categories are found in
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 221
n.8, 456 A.2d 390, 421 n.8 (1983)(Mount Laurel II). General language requiring that
the definition of the municipal housing obligation take the needs of both low- and
moderate-income households into account, in reasonable relationship to their propor-
tions in the population are found in id. at 256-57, 456 A.2d at 441- 42. In practice this
principle has generally been applied by requiring that half of all lower income units
provided under inclusionary programs be for low income households, and half for
moderate income households, as defined above. See id. at 309, 456 A.2d at 468.
In Bergen County, an affluent suburban county along the state boundary with
New York, in 1986, a family of four would be considered low income with gross earn-
ings up to $18,200, and moderate income with gross earnings between $18,201 and
$29,120. New Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs, Median Income by Metropolitan
Statistical Area and County (1985)(single sheet). The Bergen County figures are
among the highest in the state. Comparable figures for Cumberland County, a rela-
tively impoverished county along Delaware Bay, would be 0-$12,750 for a low income
family of four and $12,751-$20,400 for a moderate income family of four. Id.
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dinance, °7 provides standards sustaining the lower income oc-
cupancy and affordability of the set-aside units;20 8 governing
the relationship, both spacial and temporal, between the lower
income units and the market units in the development;209 and
governing the marketing of the lower income units and selec-
tion of lower income tenants or homebuyers.1 ° Ordinances
may also allow alternative means by which a developer can
fulfill his obligations to provide lower income housing units,
including construction of those units on another site or the
making of a cash contribution in lieu of constructing units. 1 '
207. The extent to which all of the relevant provisions of an inclusionary pro-
gram must be enacted by ordinance, versus being embodied in policy statements or
regulations adopted by administrative bodies, appears to vary widely from state to
state. Many of the California programs, for example, are "policies" rather than for-
mally adopted ordinances, which are nonetheless enforceable under California law.
See Mallach, supra note 195, at 180-85. Similarly, many substantive elements of the
Montgomery County, Maryland, program are enacted in the form of administrative
regulations from the office of the county executive. See Mallach, supra note 195, at
218-20. Given the extent to which an inclusionary program, similar to any other lower
income housing program, is likely to require extensive and detailed governing provi-
sions, the ability to adopt a general ordinance, and adopt the detailed provisions
through administrative regulation, is clearly desirable.
208. An extensive body of legal and other analysis has emerged in recent years
with respect to techniques of ensuring continued lower income affordability and occu-
pancy of units constructed under inclusionary programs, including the use of cove-
nants, deed restrictions, and the like. For an overview of this subject see A. Mallach,
supra note 195, at 133-65.
209. The many issues involved in this area include the following:
1) the extent to which lower income units should be integrated with, or sepa-
rated from the market rate units in a development;
2) the extent to which design or other controls should be imposed to ensure vis-
ual compatibility among the different unit types;
3) in particular, timing controls to prevent the outcome raised in the Mount
Laurel II decision that a developer may build "all its conventional units first and
then reneges on the obligation to build the lower income units."
Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447.
210. See A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 135-41.
211. There are numerous examples where these options are offered. See id. at
173-79. A recent, and widely publicized, variation on this approach is found where
municipalities, including San Francisco and Boston, have imposed lower income
housing obligations on nonresidential developers, often keyed to a formula that
projects the number of jobs to be added by the additional office or commercial floor
space, and translates that figure into an assessment of housing need. See id. at 179-
90. See also Inclusionary Zoning Moves Downtown (D. Merriam, D. Brower, & P.
Tegeler, eds. 1985); Urb. Land Inst., Downtown Linkages (D. Porter ed. 1985).
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In the final analysis, the central and essential element in
a successful inclusionary program is the reasonableness of the
inclusionary requirement itself and the general land use re-
quirements governing the zone district subject to inclusionary
conditions. Since the ability of the developer to provide lower
income units is determined by the economic feasibility of the
development as a whole, an inclusionary ordinance which does
not provide for a reasonable density, and permit a developer
to build the market units efficiently and profitably, and main-
tain a reasonable balance between the benefits conferred on
the developer (by virtue of the market units he can build) and
the costs imposed by the inclusionary requirements, is not
likely to produce much affordable housing.212
The precise land use standards that should be adopted, as
well as the extent - in terms of both percentage and af-
fordability range - of the inclusionary requirement will vary
significantly from community to community. The most impor-
tant factor is the nature and extent of market demand in the
community. The larger and more affluent the market for
which the developer can build, the greater the extent to which
he can simultaneously provide lower income housing. In this
respect, the economic effect of inclusionary zoning is exactly
opposite that of conventional zoning. In a conventional zoning
environment the stronger market demand creates fewer op-
portunities to develop affordable housing. Under an inclusion-
ary ordinance, the stronger market demand creates more op-
portunities for provision of lower income housing.2 3
212. There is little doubt that at least some ordinances have been drafted with
the expectation, or at least the hope, that they would prove economically unmanage-
able, and that no lower income housing would result. See A. Mallach, supra note 195,
at 107-10. Such an ordinance would be vulnerable, of course, to a taking challenge,
but it would be a difficult one to win, given the standard that must be met. See infra
note 244 and accompanying text.
213. The issue implicit in this paragraph, namely who actually pays the subsidy
cost associated with constructing lower income housing through inclusionary pro-
grams, is a complex and uncertain one, although most analysts eventually conclude
that, at least in theory, the costs should be largely passed backward in the form of
reduced land values. See A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 86-96. See also Ellickson,
The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. Calif. L. Rev. 1167, 1187-92 (1981);
Hagman, Taking Care of Ones's Own Through Inclusionary Zoning: Bootstrapping
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2. Inclusionary Zoning Works: The New Jersey Experience
Inclusionary ordinances have been in place in some
American communities since the early 1970's.214 With respect
to New York State, and the potential effect that inclusionary
zoning might have, relevant inferences can be drawn most
strongly from the experience in New Jersey since the 1983
Mount Laurel II decision. The New Jersey experience will be-
come particularly relevant if the New York judiciary reconsid-
ers the blind alley it has followed in interpreting Berenson,
and decides to incorporate inclusionary zoning as a significant
element in future remedial orders in exclusionary zoning
cases. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not require munici-
palities, in framing measures to comply with the Mount Lau-
rel II decision, to enact inclusionary ordinances. After charac-
terizing density bonus and similar incentive techniques as
being ineffective, 16 the court held that "a more effective in-
clusionary device that municipalities must use if they cannot
otherwise meet their fair share obligations is the mandatory
set-aside."21 Faced with the absence of federal or other subsi-
dies which could be used to produce lower income housing
more conventionally, most New Jersey municipalities seeking
to comply with Mount Laurel II have sought to meet all or
most of their lower income housing obligations through the
Low- and Moderate- Income Housing by Local Government, 5 Urb. Law & Policy
169 (1982).
214. Among the major jurisdictions enacting the earliest programs, all in the
early 1970's, were Fairfax County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland, and Los
Angeles, California. See Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances - Policy and Legal Issues
in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1432
(1974); H. Franklin, D. Falk & A. Levin, supra note 23, at 131-410. The Fairfax
County ordinance was subsequently invalidated in the first court test of an inclusion-
ary ordinance, in Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, 214 Va. 235, 198
S.E.2d 600 (1973), a decision characterized as "almost uniquely lacking in legal rea-
soning or rationale." N. Williams, supra note 13, § 66.27. See A. Malach, supra note
195, at 197-218. See also S. Schwartz, R. Johnston & D. Burtraw, Local Government
Initiatives for Affordable Housing: An Evaluation of Inclusionary Programs in Cali-
fornia (1981).
215. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 266-67, 456 A.2d at 445-46. See generally Fox &
Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 Has-
tings Const. L.Q. 1015 (1976); A. Mallach, supra note 195 at 13-14, 114.
216. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 267, 456 A.2d at 446.
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enactment of inclusionary zoning ordinances.
Although there is no statewide data available on the over-
all level of affordable housing development activity resulting
from Mount Laurel II, a substantial body of information is
nevertheless available which indicates that the use of inclusio-
nary programs has already had a dramatic effect on the pro-
duction of housing affordable to lower income households in
suburban New Jersey. Particularly germane is a recent study,
carried out on behalf of a private regional planning organiza-
tion in central New Jersey, which inventoried inclusionary de-
velopment within the area of interest to the Mercer-Somerset-
Middlesex Regional Study Council,' 1  an area which contains
thirty suburban townships and boroughs. Of these thirty mu-
nicipalities, however, seventeen can be considered growing
townships, with substantial remaining vacant developable
land. 21
The study found that, as of April 1986, within this area a
total of 1,754 units of low- and moderate-income housing, de-
veloped under inclusionary ordinances adopted as a result of
Mount Laurel II, were either occupied, under construction,
approved, or pending before local planning boards.2 19 Devel-
opments containing lower income housing were in some stage
of the development process in eleven of the seventeen town-
ships in the area.22
217. D. Kinsey, Affordable Housing in Central New Jersey: The Consequences of
Mount Laurel II (Apr. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Kinsey & Hand] (report prepared by
Kinsey & Hand, Princeton, N.J., for Middlesex Somerset Mercer Regional Council,
Inc., Princeton, N.J.) .
218. There are five hundred and sixty-seven municipalities in the State of New
Jersey. The area within the scope of the council, which is a purely private body with
no governmental powers, also includes the older core cities of Trenton and New
Brunswick. Manual of the Legislature of N.J. 913 (1981). It should be noted that a
borough under New Jersey law is roughly analogous to a village under New York law.
219. Kinsey & Hand, supra note 217, at 40. Specifically, forty-two units had been
occupied, three hundred eighty-four were under construction, eight hundred fifty-two
had received planning board approval, and four hundred seventy-five were pending
before various planning boards.
220. Id. This outcome, only three years after the New Jersey Supreme Court
Mount Laurel II decision, compares remarkably to past performance. The study
found that in the same thirty suburban municipalities, during the fifty years of fed-
eral housing programs, only 1,334 subsidized housing units had been provided. Id. at
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It is clear that a substantial amount of lower income
housing is being produced through inclusionary programs else-
where in New Jersey. A more detailed description of the first
development constructed and occupied as a result of the 1983
decision is informative. The development consists of two hun-
dred sixty limited-equity condominium units, built as part of
a 1,287 unit development in Bedminster, which is an affluent
suburb in the north-central part of the state.221 The distribu-
tion of the two hundred sixty units, by size, price and maxi-
mum qualifying income, is given in Table 12. After court ap-
proval, construction and marketing activities began in mid-
1984. The project was completed and occupied by spring
1985.222
TABLE 12: FEATURES OF LOW AND MODERATE INCOME UNITS CON-
STRUCTED UNDER INCLUSIONARY PROGRAM AT THE HILLS
PUD, BEDMINSTER, NEW JERSEY
UNIT TYPE SQUARE NUMBER INCOME INCOME SELLING
FOOTAGE OF UNITS CATEGORY CEILING PRICE
1 BEDROOM 558 68 LOW $13,500 $27,100
1 BEDROOM 658 44 LOW 15,150 30,100
+ LOFT 24 MOD 23,860 48,900
2 BEDROOM 760 80 MOD 26,500 54,600
3 BEDROOM 990 18 LOW 18,200 34,200
26 MOD 28,100 57,800
TOTAL 260
SOURCE: Bedminster Hills Housing Corporation, Pluckemin, New Jersey, fact
sheet distributed to prospective buyers.
Extensive arrangements were made to ensure careful
screening of prospective buyers, as well as effective monitoring
of controls on resale of the units, which were embodied in
1.
221. A. Mallach, supra note 195, at 237-53.
222. This information, as well as other information on this development, comes
from the personal experience of the author, who was directly involved in the develop-
ment of this project and is at present a member of the board of trustees and vice-
president of the Bedminster Hills Housing Corporation, a nonprofit entity with sub-
stantial responsibilities relating to the development.
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deed restrictions. A nonprofit corporation, the Bedminster
Hills Housing Corporation, was established, which was re-
sponsible for advertising of the units and initial screening of
the prospective buyers, the latter being done on the basis of a
series of carefully developed priority categories, generally pro-
viding priority for households living or working in the area
and living in substandard or overcrowded housing units.2 3
The same corporation (which is governed by a board contain-
ing representatives of the municipality, the developer, the
mortgage lender and the New Jersey Department of the Pub-
lic Advocate22 4) has responsibility, under the deed restrictions,
for establishing resale prices based on an appreciation
formula, and for referring previously screened and qualified
prospective buyers to units available on resale. 25
Full occupancy has been reached and the development
appears to have settled into a successful routine. Residents of
the lower income units, which make up a separate residential
cluster among many clusters in the development, participate
fully in the organizational life of the development freely and
utilize the available recreational facilities. There is no evi-
dence that the presence of the lower income units has had any
negative effect on the marketability of the more expensive
223. See Bedminster Hills Housing Corp., Procedure for Selection of
Homebuyers for Village Green Units - The Hills PUD, Bedminster, N.J. (undated).
224. The New Jersey Dep't of the Public Advocate is an agency of state govern-
ment generally charged with representing the public interest in a variety of forums,
with particular emphasis on public interest litigation. See Bierbaum, On the Fron-
tiers of Public Interest Law: The New Jersey State Department of the Public Advo-
cate - The Public Interest Advocacy Division, 13 Seton Hall L. Rev. 475 (1983).
The Public Advocate played a significant role in exclusionary zoning litigation in New
Jersey, particularly during the late 1970's in the cases leading to Mount Laurel II.
See Van Ness, On the Public Advocate's Involvement in Mount Laurel, 14 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 832 (1984). The Public Advocate became involved in this matter by vir-
tue of having taken responsibility for representation of low and moderate income
plaintiffs in exclusionary zoning litigation against Bedminster Township, which litiga-
tion led to the enactment of the ordinance under which the Bedminster development
was built. Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster, 205 N.J. Super 87, 500 A.2d
49 (1985).
225. The Village Green at Bedminster Neighborhood Condominium Declaration
of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Resale, Public Offering Statement Filed
by the Hills Development Co. (1984)(prepared by Brenner, Wallack & Hill,
Attorneys).
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units226 or on the manner in which the development is per-
ceived, either internally or externally.227 The developer, ini-
tially, was not eager to undertake an inclusionary develop-
ment. He has, however, come to perceive it as a more than
acceptable alternative and has, in fact, actively sought to
purchase sites subject to inclusionary requirements in other
municipalities for future development.
228
After initial hesitation, the New Jersey development com-
munity has widely embraced the inclusionary approach, find-
ing, as a rule, that, with the opportunity to build at adequate
density and without unreasonable restrictions and conditions,
the cost of providing lower income housing is more than com-
pensated by the profit opportunities of market development
in a strong economy. Much of the initial hesitation was engen-
dered by the fact that, under the Supreme Court guidelines,
the lower income units were to be priced to levels of af-
fordability substantially below those typical of inclusionary
programs in other states.22 " Developers have learned, however,
that it is possible to produce a substantial number of units
affordable by households earning less than fifty percent of the
regional median income without materially impairing the suc-
cess or profitability of their developments as a whole.
The most significant indicator of the active interest of the
development community in undertaking inclusionary develop-
ment was found in its response to the "builders remedy" of-
fered as an inducement for litigation by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court. As part of the overall emphasis on bringing
about substantive results, the Mount Laurel II court held:
226. The more expensive units in the Bedminster development sell for prices up
to $250,000. Telephone interview with John Kerwin, President, The Hills Develop-
ment Corp.
227. Interview with Carol Ann Auger, Director of Sales, Hills Development Com-
pany, and President, Bedminster Hills Housing Corporation.
228. Telephone interview with John Kerwin, President, The Hills Development
Company.
229. The Orange County, California, affordability targets, shown in Table 11
supra, at 111, are representative of California inclusionary programs. See A. Mallach,
supra note 195, at 201-07. Note that the bottom of the lowest range in the Orange
County program to be applied where no public subsidies are available, corresponds to
the top of the highest range of the Mount Laurel II standards.
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Where a developer succeeds in Mount Laurel litigation
and proposes a project providing a substantial amount of
lower income housing, a builder's remedy should be
granted unless the municipality establishes that because
of environmental or other substantial planning concerns,
the plaintiff's proposed project is clearly contrary to
sound land use planning.230
If a developer could meet three tests, therefore, the courts
would order the defendant municipality to approve the devel-
oper's project, or at least rezone the developer's land to a den-
sity reasonably consistent with efficient multi-family develop-
ment. The three-part test is: (1) that the developer prevail in
litigation (i.e., that the municipality was not in compliance
with the Mount Laurel II doctrine); (2) that the developer of-
fer to provide a substantial amount of lower income housing
in the development (typically twenty percent); (3) that the
project be not clearly inconsistent with sound land use and
environmental planning considerations.
By September 1984, approximately ninety suits had been
brought in the New Jersey courts by developers seeking a
builder's remedy.23' By June 1985, the number had grown to
one hundred and forty suits against some seventy municipali-
ties, including almost every large suburban township in north-
ern or central New Jersey.13 In the end, few builder's reme-
dies were actually granted by the courts, but the threat of
such remedies led to many settlements of Mount Laurel cases
on terms generally favorable to the developer bringing the
suit.233 The potency of this judicial weapon led to the emer-
230. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 279-80, 456 A.2d 390, 452 (1983)(Mount Laurel Ii). This was couched as an ex-
plicit reversal of the doctrine on builders' remedies set forth in Oakwood at Madison
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 551-52 n.50, 371 A.2d 1192, 1227 n.50 (1977).
231. Administrative Office of the Courts, State of New Jersey, Press Release
(Sept. 26, 1984).
232. A Listing of Mount Laurel II Litigation (June 18, 1985) (compilation by
Peggy Schnugg for Brener, Wallack & Hill, Attorneys).
233. Settlements were encouraged, arguably even coerced, by some judges hear-
ing matters similar to the Mount Laurel case. The desirability of bringing about set-
tlements, as contrasted to extended litigation and protracted appeals, was stressed in
many post-Mount Laurel II decisions. See Morris County Fair Hous. Council v.
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gence of a consensus that legislative action in the realm of ex-
clusionary zoning was necessary, which consensus led to the
enactment of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act in July 1985,
establishing an administrative structure for the meeting of
municipal lower income housing obligations and the resolution
of disputes between municipalities and developers.3 4
The current transition from the judicial system to the
new administrative system has not been without its difficul-
ties. 35 Nevertheless, it is clear that inclusionary housing pro-
grams, having demonstrated their effectiveness, will continue
to be the central means by which New Jersey municipalities
create lower income housing opportunities. The Fair Housing
Act does not require the adoption of inclusionary ordinances.
It does provide, however, that as a part of its housing plan
each municipality must consider "[riezoning for densities nec-
essary to assure the economic viability of any inclusionary de-
Boonton Township, 209 N.J. Super. 108, 506 A.2d 1284 (1986); J.W. Field Co. v.
Township of Franklin, 206 N.J. Super. 165, 501 A.2d 1075 (1985).
234. New Jersey Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:27D-301 to -329 (West
1986). The builder's remedy doctrine became a highly controversial political issue,
manipulated to considerable political advantage by a number of suburban politicians,
including the incumbent governor of New Jersey, Thomas Kean. The politicians ap-
pear to have convinced a substantial part of the suburban electorate, contrary to all
objective evidence, that the builder's remedy meant that their communities would be
overrun with hundreds of thousands of unwanted and unneeded housing units. Thus,
a major theme in the framing and adoption of the Fair Housing Act was a desire to
curb this particular aspect of the Mount Laurel II doctrine and redress what was
perceived to be the imbalance of power between developer and municipality. See
Payne, The Myths of Mount Laurel, N.J.L.J., June 5, 1986, at 4, col. 3. This is men-
tioned as background although not germane to the immediate subject, which is the
effectiveness of inclusionary zoning programs. An awareness of the potential political
ramifications of a decision might be germane to the manner in which another court
may seek to address similar remedial issues in the future.
235. The Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986), is a
poorly drafted and ambiguous document, containing many provisions designed to fa-
cilitate anticipated efforts by the Council on Affordable Housing to reduce municipal
lower income housing obligations, or, to put it in other words, to restore what was
perceived as the appropriate distribution of power between municipality and devel-
oper. For a critical view, see Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for
Delay, 15 N.J. Rptr. 21 (Oct. 1985) (monthly magazine). In the course of affirming the
constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a deci-
sion that has come to be widely known as Mount Laurel III, subsequently resolved
some of the facial inadequacies of the act. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of
Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 47-63, 510 A.2d 621, 646-54 (1986).
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velopments, either through mandatory set-asides or density
bonuses, as may be necessary to meet all or part of the mu-
nicipality's fair share. '"236 Through the use of inclusionary
zoning techniques, a municipality can ensure that the lower
income housing created will not become a segregated or iso-
lated ghetto, as often happens in suburban as well as urban
settings.2 3 7 Furthermore, the municipality can accommodate
lower income housing without materially affecting municipal
fiscal conditions because there is no direct fiscal outlay re-
quired of the municipality"' and the simultaneous construc-
tion of expensive housing ensures that deficits that might re-
sult from the lower income units are offset.
Finally, and most importantly, inclusionary programs en-
sure, to the extent that any market demand exists in the area,
that the lower income units are actually constructed. There is
no need to rely on the uncertain availability of federal subsi-
dies or the equally uncertain initiatives of local nonprofit or-
ganizations or housing authorities. The only necessary condi-
tion for production of lower income housing is that the
developer can make enough profit from construction of the
market units in the development to support the lower income
housing requirements of the ordinance. In any area of strong
market demand that condition can easily be met by a well-
drafted inclusionary ordinance. It has been demonstrated by
New Jersey, therefore, that inclusionary zoning is a uniquely
powerful tool for the creation of suburban lower income hous-
ing opportunities.
236. The Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:27D-311(a)(1) (West 1986).
237. The Homestead Village development in the Town of Brookhaven is one ex-
ample of isolation. It is the only substantial subsidized family housing project (as
distinct from senior citizen housing) in the town. It contains four hundred thirty-one
units and is located within the small black enclave of Gordon Heights. Memorandum,
supra note 60, at 31-32.
238. There may be indirect fiscal outlays, through the waiver of processing and
inspection fees on the lower income units, a common practice in New Jersey, or
through subsequent tax abatement of lower income rental housing.
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C. Inclusionary Zoning and the Future of Housing
Opportunity in New York State
Two fallacies of particular significance undergird the fail-
ure of the post-Berenson courts to address the substantive is-
sues raised in that decision. They are, first, the patent disre-
gard of the intimate relationships between land use
regulations and socioeconomic realities, and second, the treat-
ment of zoning as a passive instrument capable of creating, at
most, the threshold opportunity for development and no
more.
Zoning and land use regulation are inextricably inter-
twined in a close relationship with social and economic factors
and forces. Zoning need not be a passive element in that rela-
tionship. Land use regulation can be turned into a positive
means of counteracting the seemingly inexorable economic
pressures for higher prices and greater exclusion. It can be
used as a means of creating housing opportunity, rather than
thwarting it.
Ironically, in spite of post- Berenson lower court holdings,
the New York Court of Appeals has not been oblivious to
these issues in the past. In 1968, Judge Keating noted in
Udell v. Haas that:
Underlying the entire concept of zoning is the assumption
that zoning can be a vital tool for maintaining a civilized
form of existence only if we employ the insights and the
learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the econo-
mist, the sociologist, the public health expert and all the
other professions concerned with urban problems.239
While, arguably, this can be dismissed as little more than gen-
eralized rhetoric, it is nonetheless significant rhetoric. Fur-
thermore, it served as a starting point for the important
Maldini v. Ambro decision, in which the court of appeals ex-
plicitly embraced the socioeconomic dimension of zoning.2 40
239. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888,
893 (1968).
240. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975), cert. denied &
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The court held:
That the "users" of the retirement community district
have been considered in creating the zoning classification
does not necessarily render the amendment suspect, nor
does it clash with traditional "use" concepts of zoning. In-
cluding the needs of potential "users" cannot be disasso-
ciated from sensible community planning based upon the
"use" to which property is to be put."4 '
This is, of course, the crux of the issue. If Berenson is about
housing needs, as a facial reading of the decision clearly indi-
cates, then the needs of the "users," that is, the "residents of
Westchester County, as well as the larger New York City met-
ropolitan region . ., searching for multiple-family housing in
the area . . ." are not only relevant, but are central to deter-
mining what land use and zoning standards constitute a truly
balanced plan, a plan which takes regional and local concerns
into account.2 41
Arguably, the post-Berenson courts may have drawn
away from the implications of Maldini and adopted their self-
limiting position supporting the lack of relationship between
zoning and socioeconomic considerations, in part as a result of
the conclusion that any attention to lower income housing
needs is futile in light of what they perceived to be the inexo-
rable economic barriers to meeting those needs.24 It is in this
light that the demonstrated effectiveness of inclusionary zon-
ing becomes so important. It establishes that recognition of
the relationship between zoning and housing needs is not nec-
essarily an academic exercise. Once it is recognized that the
municipal zoning scheme must address the needs of the less
affluent residents of the New York City metropolitan area, ef-
fective regulatory tools are available through which the mu-
appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975). This decision was rendered only a few months
before the Berenson court of appeals decision. It upheld the legality of a retirement
community zoning district.
241. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d at 487, 330 N.E.2d at 407-08, 369 N.Y.S.2d at
319-92.
242. Berenson v. New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 511, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 672 (1979).
243. Id. at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
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nicipality can affirmatively address those needs through its
land use regulations. 4 These considerations suggest direc-
tions in which judicial action may transport the Berenson
244. Although there has never been a decision specifically on this issue, there
appears to be an exceptionally strong basis for concluding that an inclusionary ordi-
nance which required a developer to set aside a percentage of lower income units as a
condition of approval would be legal under existing New York State statutory and
case law. First, it should be noted that New York case law provides for a broadly
couched presumption of validity for municipal zoning enactments. See Rodgers v.
Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951). In a similar vein, it is hard
to see how a taking challenge to a fairly drafted inclusionary ordinance, such as that
raised in Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff, 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973), could
help but fail under the standard set forth in In re National Merritt, Inc. v. Robert
Weist, in which the Court of Appeals held:
[I]t should be emphasized that when we deal with a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of an ordinance as applied to a particular piece of property, the
burden is entirely on the challenger to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the property will not yield a reasonable return under any of the
uses permitted by the zoning ordinance.
In re National Merritt, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 445, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 1034, 393 N.Y.S.2d 379,
385 (1977). Second, more directly to the point of an inclusionary ordinance itself,
New York State law already contemplates the use of zoning for explicit socioeconomic
purposes. In Maldini the court of appeals noted, in support of the municipal ordi-
nance, that:
[T]he town's good faith effort to meet the special needs of its elderly, who
otherwise would be likely to be excluded from enjoyment of adequate dwell-
ings within the community, is inclusionary .... Certainly, when a community
is impelled, consistent with such criteria, to move to correct social and histor-
ical patterns of housing deprivation, it is acting well within its delegated gen-
eral welfare power.
Maldini, 36 N.Y.2d at 485-86, 330 N.E.2d at 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90. A New
Jersey case, not dissimilar to Maldini, Taxpayer's Ass'n of Weymouth Township v.
Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), was cited as a substantial part
of the court's rationale for approving of inclusionary zoning in Mount Laurel H.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 217-
72, 456 A.2d 390, 448 (1983) (Mount Laurel H). While simple logic dictates that low
income households should be entitled to the same status that Maldini provides senior
citizens, existing New York case law also reaches that conclusion. Indeed, pursuant to
N.Y. Pub. Hous. Law § 99 (McKinney 1955), municipalities are empowered to enter
into agreements with public housing authorities to zone sites to make possible devel-
opment of low income housing by those authorities. The municipal power to under-
take such special purpose socioeconomic zoning for the benefit of lower income house-
holds has been upheld in Chase v. City of Glen Cove, 34 Misc. 2d 810, 227 N.Y.S.2d
131 (1962), and in Marino v. Town of Ramapo, 68 Misc. 2d 44, 326 N.Y.S.2d 162
(1971), in which the court held that zoning based on classification by income, in fur-
therance of the objective of providing lower income housing, is both rational and le-
gal. See id. at 61-63, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 183-85.
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doctrine into reality.
First, an end to the abuse of the regulatory powers vested
in local government by the discretionary process, as applied to
multi-family housing development, is long overdue. It serves
no planning or environmental purpose recognized by profes-
sionals. It exists solely for invidious social and economic rea-
sons. The discretionary process is not only abusive in itself
but also effectively hinders any effort to implement affirma-
tive measures and inclusionary housing programs. Opportuni-
ties for development of multi-family housing, at least to the
extent dictated by the magnitude of regional housing needs,
should be permitted by right, just as opportunities are pro-
vided in the typical suburb for development of single family
houses, factories, office buildings, or shopping centers.24
Second, suburban municipalities should have an affirma-
tive obligation to provide opportunities through which local,
as well as regional, housing needs can be met. If the false im-
partiality of a facially neutral zoning ordinance is relied upon,
economic factors will ensure that local and regional housing
needs will not be satisfied. An affirmative obligation need not
necessarily lead in all cases to the enactment of inclusionary
ordinances. New Jersey municipalities, confronted with an af-
firmative obligation under Mount Laurel II, have come up
with many different approaches to meeting lower income
housing needs, many of which utilize the existing housing
stock in innovative and creative ways, grounded in the partic-
ular conditions and realities of their community. 2" In the fi-
245. This does not mean, of course, that developers could not continue, should
they so choose, to submit petitions for rezoning of other lands for multi-family use,
and that such petitions should not be approved where they meet reasonable land use
criteria. Just as unlimited discretion poses problems, which have been discussed ex-
tensively herein, a rigid and inflexible pre-mapping of all land uses will create many
difficulties over time, albeit of a different nature.
246. Among the many activities that New Jersey municipalities have undertaken
in order to comply with their lower income housing obligations under Mount Laurel
H, one may note (a) undertaking programs to rehabilitate existing housing occupied
by lower income households; (b) facilitating creation of accessory apartments at rents
affordable to lower income households; (c) facilitating use of such limited federal sub-
sidy programs as are available; (d) creating, through use of fees levied on nonresiden-
tial development, rent subsidy programs to enable lower income households to afford
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nal analysis, however, the inclusionary ordinance has been,
and undoubtedly would be in New York State as well, the
principal means by which lower income housing will be cre-
ated and the municipal affirmative obligation carried out.
An additional, and difficult, question remains for the
courts to address. The question addresses quantity - how
many units should be provided, or how much land should be
rezoned. The appellate division in Berenson rejected applica-
tion of the fair share concept, as embodied in New Jersey case
law and as proposed by the trial court below.247 In light of the
complexities and difficulties that have arisen with respect to
the fair share process in New Jersey, the reluctance of New
York's appellate division is understandable.2 48 Nonetheless,
the question of quantity cannot be disposed of easily. As an
example, assume that the Town of Brookhaven is ordered by
a court to rezone to provide by right for multi-family and
lower income housing opportunities. How much land must be
rezoned and to what densities? In a town of some three hun-
dred forty square miles, would rezoning of one hundred acres
at a density of five units per acre, with a requirement that
fifteen percent of the units be lower income housing, be con-
to rent private market apartments; (e) use of municipally owned land, or acquisition
of privately-owned land by the municipality, for lower income housing development;
(f) reation of nonprofit development entities to develop lower income housing, or
mixed income housing with a higher percentage of lower income units than would be
attractive to a private profit-motivated developer, etc. This analysis is based upon the
experiences of the author.
247. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 521-22, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669,
678-79 (1979).
248. Notwithstanding the difficulties, the process of determining municipal fair
share obligations in New Jersey has been systematized to a remarkable degree since
1983. As a result of the efforts of the special Mount Laurel judges appointed by the
Supreme Court in late 1983, a largely standardized methodology for determining mu-
nicipal fair share allocations was developed by spring 1984, and set forth in AMG
Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 207 N.J. Super. 388 (1984). The methodology set
forth in AMG was used, with minor modifications in all subsequent post-Mount Lau-
rel II litigation. Subsequently, under the Fair Housing Act, N.J. Stats. Ann.
§ 52:27D-307, the Council on Affordable Housing was mandated to develop a fair
share allocation methodology. The proposed methodology, which is similar in many
respects to that set forth in AMG, was adopted in 1986. See N.J.A.C. 5:92 (1986). All
municipalities in New Jersey now have an administratively determined lower income
housing obligation.
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sidered an adequate response? If that (which would represent
roughly 1/20 of 1 % of the land area of the town and create
the theoretical capacity for seventy-five lower income units)
were likely to be considered on its face to be inadequate,
would two hundred acres, or five hundred acres, be adequate?
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Mount Laurel II, rec-
ognized that the resolution of the fair share questions had
"produce[d] a morass of facts, statistics, projections, theories
and opinions sufficient to discourage even the staunchest sup-
porters of Mount Laurel.'"'9 It nevertheless concluded that
the adoption of a fair share doctrine, with all its difficulties,
was preferable to the absence of such a doctrine. The reason-
ing of the court is worth citing:
When we relieved the parties and the court of the ob-
ligation to determine with precision the region, its need,
and the fair share of the municipality, we underestimated
the pressures that weigh against lower income hous-
ing .... The temptation for municipalities after our de-
cision in Madison to ignore the Mount Laurel obligation
or to provide the absolute minimum of apparently realis-
tic opportunity for some lower income housing apparently
became irresistible. Some of its results are before us
today.
Trial courts interpreted Madison as shifting the bur-
den of compliance from the judiciary to the municipality
and looked sympathetically on ordinances that arguably
constituted a bona fide effort to comply. Sometimes, when
the litigation was concluded, no one would know what the
fair share of that municipality was, for no one had been
required to determine it. There was no standard that mu-
nicipalities could apply if they wanted to comply.
50
There may be alternatives to the New Jersey fair share ap-
proach. There are no alternatives addressing the underlying
question of framing, in some fashion, a standard which will 1)
249. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 248, 456 A.2d 390, 436 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).
250. Id. at 251-52, 456 A.2d at 438.
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enable all those concerned to know whether a municipality is
in compliance with its obligation to address local and regional
housing needs; 2) provide the municipality with reasonable as-
surance that it is protected from further exclusionary zoning
litigation; 3) relieve the courts of the need to engage in highly
abstract crystal-ball gazing.
As both the Berenson court, in New York, and the Mount
Laurel II court, in New Jersey, have pointed out, questions of
land use planning and housing provision preferably belong in
the legislative and administrative branches of government.215
The New York legislature has not enacted a single law in the
decade since Berenson to relieve the judiciary of their respon-
sibility in this area. Despite the court's plea for intervention
in its 1975 Mount Laurel I decision, the New Jersey legisla-
ture acted only when the explicit standards and directions of
the Mount Laurel II decision, eight years later, made it clear
that it was an issue of significance, and that it would not go
away of its own accord.
The New York legislature is unlikely to rescue its judici-
ary from the obligation of addressing these issues. The ques-
tion of exclusionary zoning and housing needs have not gone
away since the 1975 Berenson decision. The housing needs of
New York State's less affluent citizens have become more ex-
tensive and the public policy implications of continued exclu-
sionary zoning have become more pressing. It is time the New
York courts confront and address these questions in a forth-
right fashion. They are difficult questions, as are all legal
questions that address complex social, economic and political
issues. They are questions that, nevertheless, can and must be
resolved.
D. Postscript: The Issues Remain Unresolved
The New York Court of Appeals has spoken in Suffolk
Housing Services,252 and the issues raised by the case are no
251. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243,
378 N.Y.S.2d 682, 682 (1975); Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
252. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhave, No. 87-150, slip op. (N.Y. Ct.
App. June 11, 1987).
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nearer a serious resolution than before. While the decision is
unfortunate as respects the merits of the case before it, it is
doubly so in its failure to even address the serious issues
raised by the case; much as an earlier commentator character-
ized the equally unfortunate DeGroff decision in Virginia, 53 it
is a decision "almost uniquely lacking in legal reasoning or ra-
tionale."254 It is sad evidence of the current diminished state
of what was once one of the great state courts.
The decision itself hinges on two, and only two, points:
the nature of the factual findings of the lower court which led
the court of appeals to conclude that "[pilaintiffs, in sum,
have failed to demonstrate that efforts by the Town caused
the claimed shortage of shelter; '255 and the "abstract charac-
ter. . . of the relief sought. ' 25 6 In focusing on the absence of a
plea for relief from the denial of a specific development appli-
cation, the court appeared unwilling to address either the sys-
temic nature of the issues raised by the plaintiffs, or the possi-
bility that an issue such as exclusionary zoning with its
overriding social and economic effects might not be effectively
addressed by individual idiosyncratic lawsuits hinging on the
peculiarities of specific parcels and planning boards. Indeed,
the court appears to have retreated to a nineteenth century
view of their role, by characterizing anything going beyond
the relief of concrete and immediate harm to specific named
individuals as "legislative" relief, and therefore beyond the
appropriate bound of the judicial role.257 While the court did
not overturn earlier lower court decisions that found that
plaintiffs had standing to bring the case, they appear to have
enunciated a new legal doctrine: public interest plaintiffs may
have standing to bring cases of this nature, but no standing to
253. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County of DeGroff Enter., Inc., 214 Va. 235,
198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
254. 3 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law 77 (1975).
255. Suffolk Hous. Servs., No. 87-150, slip op. at 1.
256. Id. slip op. at 6.
257. Id. Note that the court substantially misrepresented the nature of relief
sought by plaintiffs, characterizing them as: "askling] the courts to undertake radical
re-zoning of some 49,100 acres .... " (Id. slip op. at 4.) a request unrelated to any-
thing explicitly or implicitly sought by plaintiffs.
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win them.
The decision is not necessarily hostile to the interests of
the poor, nor does it offer a blank check for exclusionary local
land use practices. It can arguably be read as encouraging the
developers of lower income housing to bring suits challenging
their denial of special permits or rezoning, and to vindicate in
that manner the rights of the low income and minority groups
"yearning ... for decent housing they can afford in decent
surroundings. ' 258 Such lawsuits are potentially important; the
question is, however, whether in light of today's realities this
apparent opportunity may not be more of an abstraction than
the remedies sought by plaintiffs and which the court charac-
terized as abstract. 29
In the final analysis, what the court failed to do remains
more significant than what they did. Nowhere in the decision
is any awareness of the complex social and economic interplay
between the zoning laws and the lack of housing opportunity
for the poor; nowhere even appears a glimmer of understand-
ing of the pattern, lavishly documented in the legal and plan-
ning literature for over two decades, between discretionary
land use regulation and exclusion.
The problems addressed by the articles in this issue, in
the final analysis, are still left unresolved by the court of ap-
peals decision. They will not go away, because they go to the
core of the decision-making process of local government, and
its effect on the poor and on racial minorities. One can only
hope that some day the New York State judiciary will be
ready to deal with them.
258. Id. slip op. at 6 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 528-29 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting)).
259. Id.
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